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IMITATION OR IMPROVEMENT?  THE EVOLUTION OF 
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 
UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA  
 
Ann M. Scarlett* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Within the evolving global economy, corporations must compete to raise 
capital from investors.  Those investors may include individuals, other 
corporations, banks, governments, and institutional shareholders such as pension 
funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and hedge funds.  Numerous factors 
impact an investor’s decision to invest money in a particular corporation.  For 
instance, investors in corporations created within the United States may choose to 
invest in a corporation’s shares or bonds depending on their desired level of risk 
and rate of return.1  Such investors will also typically invest in a variety of U.S. 
corporations, as well as perhaps other investment devices such as commodities, to 
diversify the overall risk to their investment portfolios.  Another method for 
diversification is investing in foreign corporations. 
People in the United States have always invested in foreign economies.2  
Investment companies actively encourage U.S. investors to invest in a variety of 
foreign markets.  For instance, E*Trade Financial encourages its customers “to 
diversify [their] portfolio by trading currencies and stocks in six global markets—
Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, and the [United Kingdom].”3  
Noble Trading offers international stock trading in twenty-six countries’ stock, 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University.  This article has benefited 
immeasurably from comments by participants in a workshop at the Salmon P. Chase 
College of Law at Northern Kentucky University.  I thank Nicole Oelrich for her excellent 
and thorough research assistance. 
1. Shares represent an ownership interest, which entitles the owners to a pro rata 
share of dividends and to vote for the corporation’s directors as well as certain other 
matters.  Shares are seen as risky investments because, if the corporation ultimately fails, 
the shareholders are entitled to their pro rata share of any assets remaining, if any, after all 
other claims have been paid.  On the other hand, bonds are long-term debt securities, which 
resemble a loan with fixed interest and principal payments over a set number of years.  
Bondholders would be repaid their investment before any shareholders in the event the 
corporation fails, but they are entitled only to the amount of their investment plus interest 
as established by the bond contract.  Thus, while shares are riskier investments if the 
corporation fails, shareholders can achieve exponential returns if the corporation succeeds.  
2. J.J. Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge, in 7 GOVERNMENTS AND 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 51, 51–52 (Theodore H. Moran ed., 1993). 
3. Understand E*Trade Global Trading, E*TRADE FINANCIAL, 
https://us.etrade.com/e/t/estation/pricing?id=1301300000#__highlight (last visited Dec. 31, 
2011).  
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option, and future exchanges.4  There are even entire companies devoted to 
investing in certain international markets.  For example, the International Finance 
Corporation, a part of the World Bank Group, provides debt and equity financing 
for private enterprises in developing countries,5 and its investors represent 182 
countries.6  Indeed, in the ever-increasing global economy, investors are now 
devoting significant amounts of capital to international markets.7 
An investor seeking to invest in a foreign company, however, must 
consider numerous factors and risks.  In certain countries, the investor must worry 
whether the country’s government will nationalize corporations within its borders 
or seize corporate assets in some other manner.  For example, Zimbabwe 
announced that all foreign-owned mining companies must dispose a majority of 
their shares to locals by September 25, 2011, pursuant to a controversial 
indigenization law.8  Similarly, Venezuela nationalized its oil industry, and its 
president has announced plans to nationalize other companies.9  
In all countries, the investor fears that the government will impose taxes, 
regulations, or reporting requirements that will detrimentally affect the return on 
the investment.  For example, recent regulatory changes in the United States as 
well as its corporate tax rates may cause investors in other countries to hesitate 
before investing in U.S. corporations.10  Other country-specific considerations 
                                                 
4. International Stock Trading, NOBLE TRADING, http://www.nobletrading.com/ 
worldwide.php (last visited Dec. 31, 2011).  
5. INT’L FUNDING CORP., FUNDING OPERATIONS 3 (Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/404fda004851d859b815f9fc046daa89/Fact%2Bshee
t_%2Bdiscount%2Bnote%2Bprogram%2B2011.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. 
6. Id. at 7.  
7. P. Krishna Prasanna, Foreign Institutional Investors: Investment Preference in 
India, 3 J. ADMIN. & GOVERNANCE 40, 41 (2008) (“In this age of transnational capitalism, 
significant amounts of capital are flowing from developed world to emerging economies.”).  
See also Todd Moss et al., Why Doesn’t Africa Get More Equity Investment?: Frontier 
Stock Markets, Firm Size, and Asset Allocation of Global Emerging Market Funds 1 (Ctr. 
for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 112, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=981196 (stating that foreign institutional investors’ investments in 
emerging markets have risen from $25 billion in 1990 to $300 billion in 2005). 
8. Devon Maylie & Farai Mutsaka, Zimbabwe Shuts Out Foreign Minors, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 28, 2011, at A15. 
9. Larry B. Pascal, Developments in the Venezuelan Hydrocarbon Sector, 5 L. & 
BUS. REV. AM. 531, 533 (2009) (noting that Venezuela nationalized its oil industry in 
1973); Frank Walsh, Flipping the Act of State Presumption: Protecting America’s 
International Investors from Foreign Nationalization Programs, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 
369, 371 (2008) (noting that on January 8, 2007, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez 
announced his plan to nationalize the country’s telephone company and its largest electric 
company, which are both partially owned by U.S. companies). 
10. See James Gattuso et al., Editorial, Red Tape Rising: Obama’s Torrent of New 
Regulation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2010, at A12, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303362404575580551313971136.html 
(quoting a Small Business Administration report calculating regulatory costs at $1.75 
trillion annually); Martin Vaughan, U.S. Business Faces Burden from New IRS Rules – 
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include the stability of the government, the stock market, and the monetary 
currency.  The investor should also be concerned about the law governing the 
corporation’s management, such as whether the country has enacted statutes to 
restrain managers from looting the company and to allow investors to hold 
managers accountable for their misconduct.  Thus, a country’s corporate laws 
constitute an important basis by which corporations compete for investors within 
the global economy. 
This article examines one aspect of corporate law that has recently 
changed in many countries: shareholder derivative litigation.  It would be 
impractical for one article to compare more than a handful of countries’ laws and 
practices regarding shareholder derivative litigation.  When considering 
investments in foreign countries, numerous methods for categorizing countries 
come to mind.  Countries could be grouped by their approaches to the law such as 
common law, civil law, and socialist law.11  More broadly, countries could be 
divided into developed economies (such as the United States, United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia) and emerging economies (such as India and China).  Any 
categorization of countries is a rough and imperfect divider.  Further, in today’s 
global economy, a country’s borders do not determine all the relevant concerns for 
investors in its business entities because one country’s economic downturn often 
affects other countries.  For example, the recent debt crisis in Greece has impacted 
other countries within the European Union.12  Similarly, the recent housing bubble 
and mortgage securitization meltdown in the United States has been felt by much 
of the rest of the world.13  This article compares the history and recent 
                                                                                                                
Report, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748703636404575353281768628138.html (discussing concerns expressed 
by IRS’s Office of the Taxpayer Advocate about the health care law’s requirement that 
businesses report any payments to a vendor that exceeds $600 a year); Richard T. Page, The 
International and Comparative Tax War: A Strategic Tax Cut Recommendation for the 
Obama Administration, 8 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 290–93 (2009) (noting the United 
States has the second highest corporate tax rate in the world).  Cf. Maureen Minehan, New 
Administration Could Bring New Challenges for Employers, 18 WINTER INT’L HR J. 7, 7 
(2009) (“In an already volatile market, businesses should immediately prepare for 
impending changes related to wages, immigration, taxes, health care, executive 
compensation and benefits, civil rights and . . . an inevitable increase in unionization in the 
U.S.”). 
11. LARRY CATA BACKER, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW: UNITED STATES, 
EUROPEAN UNION, CHINA AND JAPAN 1129 (2002). 
12. See Simon Nixon, Don’t Bet on an Imminent Euro-Zone Debt Default, WALL ST. 
J., April 18, 2011, at C10; see also Editorial, A.I.G., Greece, and Who’s Next?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 5, 2010, at A26 (noting “Greece has tottered on the brink of fiscal chaos, threatening 
to drag much of Europe down with it”); Bond Sale Lifts Greece, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 5, 2010, 
News, at 26 (noting that Greece faces a “disastrous debt default . . . that has shaken the 
European Union”). 
13. Mark Landler, Housing Woes in U.S. Spread Around Globe, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 
2008, at A1 (“The collapse of the housing bubble in the United States is mutating into a 
global phenomenon . . . .”); Editorial, Who’s to Blame for Economy?, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 
2008, at 10A (“[T]he Wall Street firms that created bundles of subprime mortgages and 
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developments of shareholder derivative litigation within the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.  These countries are not only all common law 
countries with developed economies, but their legal systems also are all rooted in 
English legal traditions.14  
Part II of this article explains the basic nature of corporations and 
shareholder derivative litigation in the United States, which has the most 
recognized and frequent uses of such litigation.  Drawing comparisons to the 
United States, Part III describes the structure of corporations and the evolution of 
shareholder derivative litigation in the United Kingdom, from which the United 
States originally imported the derivative device.  This article will demonstrate the 
very different paths that such litigation has taken in these two countries and 
explain the United Kingdom’s recent transition to a statutory shareholder 
derivative action that partially resembles the statutes of many U.S. states.  Parts IV 
and V then discuss shareholder derivative litigation within Canada and Australia, 
and demonstrate that these countries have also adopted shareholder derivative 
statutes comparable in many respects to those of U.S. states.  Reflecting upon this 
comparative analysis of shareholder derivative litigation, Part VI evaluates the 
criticisms of such litigation in the United States including arguments that it should 
be abolished or severely limited.  This article concludes by examining the statutes 
of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia to determine the influence of U.S. 
critics advocating for limitations on derivative actions and to assess any potential 
improvements for U.S. shareholder derivative litigation. 
 
 
II. THE UNITED STATES 
 
  Corporations in the United States are created by state law, not federal 
law.15  Each of the fifty states has enacted statutes that govern the creation and 
operation of the corporations incorporated under its laws. 16  A majority of states 
have enacted corporation statutes based on the Model Business Corporations Act 
(MBCA),17 which was drafted by a committee of the American Bar Association in 
                                                                                                                
other toxic financial instruments, . . . peddled them as low-risk, high-return investments. 
These securities . . . fueled the housing bubble and infected the global financial system.”). 
14. The United States, Canada, and Australia are former English colonies, and 
England is now part of the United Kingdom. 
15. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (“Corporations are 
creatures of state law, and . . . state law will govern the internal affairs of the 
corporation.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate 
Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1784 (2011) (noting that state law creates 
corporations as well as determines the rights of shareholders and the powers of directors). 
16. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 1.2, at 5 (2002).  
17. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN., preface v. (4th 2008); see also Renee M. Jones, 
Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case for Regulatory Redundancy, 86 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1273, 1294 (2009) (“Although Delaware is the leader among states in fashioning the 
law and settling disputes on significant corporate matters, the [MBCA] also has a 
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1950 and was substantially revised in 1984.18  Although not an adopter of the 
MBCA, Delaware is the well-recognized leader in corporate law,19 and courts in 
other states often look to it when interpreting their own statutes.20  Despite their 
different statutory foundations, the laws of Delaware and states adopting the 
MBCA are substantively similar.21  
Under statutory law in U.S. states, corporations have a single board of 
directors, and directors are elected by the shareholders.22  The directors usually 
include both executive officers and independent outside directors.23  Independent 
directors must comprise at least half the board of directors for publicly traded 
corporations.24  However, even with a majority of independent directors on the 
board, critics question directors’ ability to effectively supervise the corporation’s 
officers.25  
                                                                                                                
significant influence on the development of corporate law standards throughout the 
country.”). 
18. See John E. Mulder, Foreward to ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, at iii 
(1959).  The text of the Revised Model Act appears in MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. (4th 
2008).  
19. Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, U. 
ILL. L. REV. 661, 678 (2008) (“The corporation leader in the United States is now 
Delaware.”); see also Jones, supra note 17, at 1287 n.46 (noting that “tiny Delaware [is] the 
dominant state in setting corporate law rules”); Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small 
Wonder: Delaware’s Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1129, 1172 (2008) (“Delaware is viewed as a pioneer and perennial leader in the market for 
corporate law.”); Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal 
Penumbra of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 354 (2009) (noting 
Delaware courts’ power to define and alter corporate governance). 
20. Jones, supra note 17, at 1294 (noting that courts in other states often “follow 
Delaware law as persuasive authority in many decisions under their own statutes and 
common law”). 
21. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2000) (“[T]here are few substantive 
differences between Delaware law and that of other states.”). 
22. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 212(b) (2008); MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT [MBCA] §§ 7.29, 8.03(c) (2008). 
23. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 923 (1999) (defining independent 
directors as outside directors without affiliations to the corporation). 
24. Nicola Faith Sharpe, Rethinking Board Function in the Wake of the 2008 
Financial Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 99, 109 (2010); DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE 
BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME 
FROM 183 (2005) (“Most large corporations already have a majority of disinterested 
directors on their boards.”); NASDAQ, INC., STOCK MARKET RULES § 5605(b)(1) (2009) 
(requiring that a majority of the board be composed of independent directors); NYSE, INC., 
LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (2009), available at 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/ (same). 
25. See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 24, at 184 (“All but two of Enron’s directors were 
disinterested, . . . yet the directors simply nodded their heads as [the CEO and CFO] spun 
their web of magnificent promises and prophecies.”); Bhagat & Black, supra note 23, at 
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Under state statutes, the board of directors possesses the authority to 
manage the corporation.26  Because shareholders elect the directors, they 
theoretically may hold those directors accountable for their decisions by electing 
new directors to the board.27  Other than electing directors, shareholders possess 
the power to vote only on dissolution, sales, mergers, and amendments to bylaws 
and the articles of incorporation.28  If shareholders believe directors and officers 
are acting in their self-interest, mismanaging the corporation, or failing to exercise 
proper oversight, often their only recourse, aside from selling their shares, is to 
file a shareholder derivative lawsuit.29 
Section A discusses the roots of shareholder derivative actions in the 
United States and the current state laws governing them.  Despite the availability 
of shareholder derivative litigation, as Section B explains, U.S. courts typically 
defer to directors’ decisions and thus do not impose liability in such actions.  
Section C then discusses the fiduciary duties owed by directors pursuant to state 
law because such duties form the substantive allegations of most shareholder 
derivative actions. 
 
 
A. U.S. States Recognize Shareholder Derivative Litigation Under Common 
Law or Statutes  
 
Courts in the United States have long recognized the shareholder 
derivative action, allowing shareholders to bring lawsuits on behalf of the 
                                                                                                                
922 (stating that “[i]ndependent directors often turn out to be lapdogs rather than 
watchdogs”); Sharpe, supra note 24, at 109 (“Most corporations have boards where a 
majority of directors are outsiders; however, these boards often are composed of 
individuals who are not qualified to assess the strategic viability of the corporations they 
direct.”). 
26. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”); 
MBCA § 8.01(b) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the 
board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall 
be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors 
. . . .”).  
27. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 212(b); MBCA §§ 7.29, 8.03(c). 
28. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 105 (2004). 
29. See Henry G. Manne, The “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, 62 
COLUM. L. REV. 399, 409 (1962) (noting that other than voting rights, the only methods of 
shareholder protection are the sale of shares and the derivative lawsuit); Mary Elizabeth 
Matthews, The Shareholder Derivative Suit in Arkansas, 52 ARK. L. REV. 353, 411 (1999) 
(“[I]t should be remembered that when a corporation is wronged and the board refuses to 
remedy that wrong, a derivative suit is the shareholder’s only method of redress.”); see also 
Brown v. Tenney, 532 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Ill. 1988) (“The derivative suit is a device to 
protect shareholders against abuses by the corporation, its officers and directors, and is a 
vehicle to ensure corporate accountability.”). 
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corporation in certain circumstances.30  This form of representative lawsuit was 
imported from the English Courts of Chancery.31  Much of the law regarding 
shareholder derivative actions was created through common law development by 
courts.32  Indeed, all but the procedural aspects of Delaware’s shareholder 
derivative law are still governed by common law.33  Most U.S. states have now 
statutorily enacted procedures governing shareholder derivative lawsuits, and 
many have adopted both the procedures and substantive liability standards of the 
MBCA.34  However, even though the MBCA articulates substantive standards of 
liability, courts must still apply those standards to the facts of each case just as the 
Delaware courts must apply their common law precedents.  Because courts in 
MBCA states often look to Delaware case law when applying the MBCA’s 
liability standards,35 the legal results tend not to differ between these states.36 
Shareholders may file a derivative action on behalf of a corporation for 
an injury to the corporation,37 a power that is now recognized by statute in the 
federal court system and in most states.38  Typical shareholder derivative lawsuits 
assert claims for monetary damages based on corporate mismanagement, whereby 
                                                 
30. See Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) (using trust law as an 
analogy, the court allowed minority shareholders to pursue a derivative lawsuit asserting 
that the directors invested the corporation’s money without authority and for personal 
reasons); Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831) (using the trust law analogy, 
the court permitted a shareholder to sue derivatively in an action claiming the directors took 
corporate assets in violation of their fiduciary duty); see also Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 
450, 460 (1881) (stating the requirements for a shareholder to file a derivative action). 
31. See Hawes, 104 U.S. at 454–57, 460 (discussing the requirements for filing a 
shareholder derivative action under English case law and adopting them); see also Nicholas 
Calcina Howson, When “Good” Corporate Governance Makes “Bad” (Financial) Firms: 
The Global Crisis and the Limits of Private Law, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
(2009), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/first-impressions. 
32. See Hawes, 104 U.S. at 454–57, 460; see also Bert S. Prunty, Jr., The 
Shareholders’ Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 980–92 
(1957) (discussing the case law history of shareholder derivative actions in England and the 
United States); David A. Skeel, The Accidental Elegance of Aronson v. Lewis, 3–6 (U. of 
Penn., Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 07-28, 2007) (same). 
33. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746–51 (Del. 
Ch. 2005) (referencing case law for the standards governing the business judgment rule 
defense and directors’ fiduciary duties), aff’d, 906 A.2d 52 (Del. 2006); DEL. CH. CT. R. 
23.1 (stating procedural requirements for filing shareholder derivative actions). 
34. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 368–69; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN., preface at 
v. (4th 2008) (listing a majority of states as adopting the MBCA).  For the procedural 
requirements for shareholder derivative proceedings filed in MBCA states, see MBCA 
§§ 7.40–7.46, and for the substantive liability standards, see § 8.31.  
35. Jones, supra note 17, at 1294; see also William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of 
the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 
48 BUS. LAW. 351 (1992). 
36. See infra Part II.C. 
37. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 362.  
38. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a) (2011); MBCA § 7.40(1).  
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the corporation as a whole has suffered harm as a result.39  A shareholder may also 
file a direct shareholder lawsuit when the shareholder has suffered an injury in his 
or her individual capacity.40  For example, when the majority shareholders have 
oppressed or “frozen-out” a minority shareholder, such as by taking all the 
corporation’s profits for themselves, the minority shareholder may file a direct 
lawsuit.41  
A shareholder derivative lawsuit faces significant hurdles and 
disincentives.  In order to have the standing required to initiate or maintain a 
derivative action, federal and state courts require the plaintiff to have been a 
shareholder at the time of the challenged transaction.42  In addition, the plaintiff 
must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders.43  As a separate hurdle, several states’ statutes require shareholders 
owning less than a prescribed amount of stock, measured either by shares or 
dollars, to post a bond in an amount sufficient to cover the defendants’ reasonable 
attorneys’ fees and expenses.44  A bond requirement is a tremendous financial 
disincentive to filing derivative actions.  
Even in the absence of a bond requirement, a shareholder often has little 
financial incentive to initiate derivative litigation because any monetary recovery 
belongs to the corporation.45  The shareholder thus benefits only to the extent that 
the monetary recovery increases the value of his or her percentage shareholding in 
the corporation.  Further, no financial incentive likely exists for a shareholder 
contemplating a derivative action seeking solely injunctive relief, such as an order 
requiring the directors to refrain from certain conduct.46  
Perhaps the largest financial hurdle for a shareholder contemplating a 
derivative lawsuit is financing the lawsuit.  This financial burden, however, can be 
alleviated if the shareholder can find an attorney willing to take the representation 
on a contingency basis.  Contingency fee agreements are permitted in the United 
States, unlike most countries.47  U.S. contingency agreements typically state that 
                                                 
39. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 363. 
40. Id. § 8.2, at 362–64. 
41. See, e.g., Brodie v. Jordan, 847 N.E.2d 1076 (Mass. 2006). 
42. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a), (b)(1); MBCA § 7.41; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a), 
(b) (2009). 
43. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a), (b)(1); MBCA § 7.41.  Cf. DEL. CH. CT. R. 
23.1(a)–(b) (2009) (requiring an affidavit disclaiming any benefit from serving as the 
representative of shareholders). 
44. WRIGHT ET AL., 7C FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. 2d § 1835 (2006) (listing Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and 
Wisconsin as states adopting security or bond for expense requirements); see, e.g., COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 7-107-402(3) (2007) (allowing a court to compel a shareholder who owns less 
than a prescribed amount of stock to post a bond); NY BUS. CORP. LAW § 627 (same). 
45. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 362–63.  
46. See Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361, 
381 (2008). 
47. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The 
Lessons from Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1999). 
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the attorney will receive nothing if the plaintiff loses and that the attorney will 
receive as much as 40% of the monetary award if the plaintiff wins or settles.48  If 
a shareholder derivative lawsuit settles, which most do,49 the court can approve 
payment of a sizeable fee for the plaintiff’s attorney from the settlement fund.50  
When the rare derivative lawsuit reaches a final verdict, courts have been quite 
willing to award the plaintiff’s attorney his or her fees from the monetary 
recovery.51  On the bright side, shareholders who lose their derivative actions must 
pay only their own attorneys’ fees pursuant to the so-called American Rule.52  
Thus, unlike in countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia,53 
losing shareholders in the United States do not pay the defendants’ attorneys’ 
                                                 
48. Lester Brickman, Anatomy of an Aggregate Settlement: The Triumph of 
Temptation Over Ethics, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 700, 706 (2011) (stating that in nonclass 
litigation, lawyers typically charge contingency fees ranging from 33% to 40%); Brian T. 
Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2045 n.9 
(2010) (citing various sources for the proposition that the typical contingency fee is 33% to 
40%). 
49. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 55, 60 (1991) (finding that about 65% of shareholder derivative lawsuits 
settle); see also Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical 
Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1756 (2010) (finding that nearly all shareholder 
derivative lawsuits settle); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as 
Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 9 (1985) (noting that a 
majority of shareholder derivative lawsuits are resolved through settlement). 
50. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c) (“A derivative action may be settled, voluntarily 
dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”); Mark J. Loewenstein, 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation and Corporate Governance, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 25–
26 (1999) (“Whether a shareholder derivative suit presents a valid claim or not, the 
plaintiffs’ lawyer may stand to receive a large fee from a settlement, even a settlement that 
brings little or no benefit to the corporation.”). 
51. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970) (recognizing 
that plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees in derivative litigation because allowing “others 
to obtain full benefit from the plaintiff’s efforts without contributing equally to the 
litigation expenses would be to enrich the others unjustly at the plaintiff’s expense”); 
Loewenstein, supra note 50, at 2 (“[C]ourts have been willing to award attorneys’ fees to 
the plaintiff if the derivative litigation resulted in a ‘substantial or common benefit’ to the 
corporation, whether by judgment or settlement.”). 
52. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); 
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443 (2007). 
53. Bernard Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 
Two: Court Procedures, Indemnification and Insurance, and Administrative and Criminal 
Liability (Report to the Russian Securities Agency), 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 14 (2008)  
(stating that Canada follows the English “loser pays” rule); S. Stuart Clark, Thinking 
Locally, Suing Globally: The International Frontiers of Mass Tort Litigation in Australia, 
74 DEF. COUNS. J. 139, 148 (2007) (stating that Australia follows the English rule of loser 
pays); see also Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability Across 
Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1406, 1434 (2006) (discussing the U.K.’s loser pays 
rules). 
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fees.54  If the shareholders’ attorney was hired on a contingency fee basis, then the 
shareholders owe nothing to their own attorney. 
The demand requirement is another significant procedural hurdle of 
shareholder derivative litigation in the United States.  In federal court and most 
state courts, a shareholder may file a derivative action only after making demand 
on the board to rectify the challenged transaction.55  Indeed, the MBCA’s 
universal demand requirement cannot be avoided.56  The demand requirement is 
justified on the basis that the board of directors typically controls the corporation’s 
litigation because it possesses the statutory authority to manage the corporation 
and its assets, including any cause of action belonging to the corporation.57  The 
board may respond to the shareholder’s demand by filing the lawsuit itself, 
resolving the matter internally, or rejecting the demand.58  The typical board 
response is to reject the demand,59 which then requires the shareholder to 
demonstrate to the court that the demand was wrongfully rejected before a 
derivative action may proceed.60  In some states, the shareholder can forgo making 
demand by pleading that it is excused, which requires a showing that the demand 
would be futile.61  
To establish that the demand is futile or that the demand was wrongfully 
rejected by the board, the plaintiff must show that the business judgment rule 
defense does not apply to the board’s decision.62  As more fully explained below, 
this defense presumes that directors acted consistently with their fiduciary duties 
                                                 
54. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 247; Franklin Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative 
Light, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 453, 488 (2007). 
55. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; MBCA § 7.42. 
56. MBCA § 7.42 (“No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: a 
written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action; and 90 days 
have expired from the date the demand was made unless the shareholder has earlier been 
notified that the demand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury to 
the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90-day period.”). 
57. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MBCA § 8.01(b). 
58. See Lisa Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ 
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 408 (2005). 
59. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 395; see also Fairfax, supra note 58, at 408 
(noting that “most boards” decide “not to bring any action”). 
60. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1219 (Del. 1996); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, 
at 395. 
61. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814–15 (Del. 1984), overruled on other 
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000).  Cf. MBCA § 7.42 (2008) 
(stating a universal demand requirement).   
62. Beneville v. York, 769 A.2d 80, 85 n.9 (Del. Ch. 2000); FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; 
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 395.  Courts often state that plaintiffs already sufficient tools 
for gathering evidence without discovery.  See, e.g., Grimes, 673 A.2d at  1216 n.11 
(describing shareholders’ access to public sources and right to inspect corporate records); 
see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (shareholder’s inspection right); MBCA § 16.02 
(same). 
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of care, loyalty, and good faith.63  To rebut this presumption in the demand 
context, the shareholder typically must prove that a majority of directors were 
financially interested in the challenged decision or were not independent in 
making that decision.64  In other words, a trial court will permit a shareholder 
derivative lawsuit to proceed only when the board of directors is disabled by some 
conflict of interest.  In such circumstances, the judge may presume the directors 
would not choose to sue themselves despite the existence of meritorious claims.  
Courts frequently find that the business judgment rule protects directors’ rejection 
of a demand request.65 
 Even if a shareholder derivative action survives a motion to dismiss 
based on the demand requirement, the corporation’s directors may attempt to stop 
the litigation through a special litigation committee.66  The board may appoint a 
special litigation committee that is composed of independent and disinterested 
directors.67  After investigation and consultation with experts, the special litigation 
committee may seek to terminate the shareholder’s action (through a motion to 
dismiss or motion for summary judgment) based on its recommendation that 
continuing the litigation is not in the best interests of the corporation.68  Most 
courts find that the business judgment rule defense protects the committee’s 
recommendation69 and therefore grant the motion to dismiss.70 
                                                 
63. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–
17 (Del. 2000). 
64. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814–15 (Del. 1984); see also Beneville, 769 A.2d at 85 
n.9.  For the MBCA provisions for showing demand was wrongfully rejected, see MBCA 
§ 7.44(c). 
65. Fairfax, supra note 58, at 408 (noting that courts defer to directors’ rejection of a 
demand request). 
66. Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule – the Business Judgment Rule, 
36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 647–48 (2002).  
67. Id. at 648. 
68. Id.; see also Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules 
and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 279 (1985) (noting that a special litigation committee (SLC) may 
believe dismissal is in the corporation’s best interest, because it may raise the stock price). 
69. In some states, the plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting the business judgment 
rule presumption with respect to the SLC’s decision, and judicial inquiry is limited to the 
disinterestedness and independence of the SLC members and the adequacy of their 
investigation.  See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001–02 (N.Y. 1979); 
Finley v. Super. Ct., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Cutshall v. Barker, 
733 N.E.2d 973, 978 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 
889–90 (Minn. 2003).  Other states also give business judgment rule protection to a SLC’s 
recommendation but put the burden of proof on the defendants.  See, e.g., Lewis v. Boyd, 
838 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).  In Delaware, the defendant also bears the 
burden of proving the independence and good faith of the SLC, but the court may apply its 
own business judgment in deciding whether to dismiss.  Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 
A.2d 779, 787–89 (Del. 1981). 
70. Fairfax, supra note 58, at 409 (noting that “in the vast majority of cases courts 
grant the motion based on the [SLC’s] recommendation”) (citing Carol B. Swanson, 
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B. U.S. States Judicially or Statutorily Defer to Directors’ Business Judgment  
 
 Assuming plaintiffs survive these initial motions to dismiss, the directors 
can again assert the business judgment rule defense in a motion for summary 
judgment or at trial.71  The business judgment rule defense was created by 
common law, and U.S. courts have recognized the defense for almost 200 years.72  
A frequently stated rationale for the business judgment rule defense is that it 
provides the protection directors need to fulfill their responsibility to manage the 
corporation without fear of shareholders second-guessing their decisions through 
derivative lawsuits.73  Thus, the rule allows directors to take calculated business 
risks74 by protecting them from liability “for honest mistakes of judgment or 
unpopular business decisions.”75  Other justifications include that directors are 
“better-suited than courts to make business decisions” and that “judges are not 
business experts.”76  
 The Delaware Supreme Court articulates the business judgment rule 
defense as a presumption that directors have acted consistently with their fiduciary 
duties in making decisions for the corporation.77  To rebut that presumption, 
                                                                                                                
Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the 
Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1356–57 (1993)). 
71. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005), 
aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
72. S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 
93 (1979–1980).  
73. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927–28 (Del. 2003); 
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 
cmt. d (1994).  
74. See Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 110; see also Branson, supra note 66, at 637 
(stating the business judgment rule is necessary to encourage directors to engage in 
“informed risk taking that is essential to business success”); Len Costa, Boss of the Bosses: 
Delaware’s Most Important Judge Takes on Greedy Executives, Congress, and the History 
of Corporate Law, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2005, at 43, 46 (stating that Delaware courts 
do not “second-guess decisions made by informed, disinterested boards, for fear of chilling 
commerce and innovation”). 
75. Arsht, supra note 72, at 96; see also Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 113–14 
(“Business decisions . . . typically involve prudential judgments among a number of 
plausible alternatives.  Given the vagaries of business, moreover, even carefully made 
choices among such alternatives may turn out badly.”). 
76. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Branson, supra 
note 66, at 637 (stating that “courts are ill-equipped to review business decisions” because 
they “often involve intangibles, intuitive insights or surmises as to business matters such as 
competitive outlook, cost structure, and economic and industry trends”).  This judicial 
deference for business decisions is difficult to justify when courts will review decisions of 
physicians and engineers.  See Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 120; FRANK H. EASTERBROOK 
& DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 94 (1991).  
77. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006).  
To invoke the business judgment rule defense, the board must make a decision, which 
includes a decision to act or a conscious decision not to act.  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 
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plaintiffs must show a breach of fiduciary duty78 or demonstrate fraud, illegality, 
or waste.79  If the plaintiff cannot rebut the presumption, the business judgment 
rule defense protects the directors from liability for their decision.80  On the other 
hand, if the plaintiff can rebut the presumption, the directors must prove that the 
challenged transaction was fair to the corporation.81  
 The MBCA also contains the principal elements of the Delaware 
business judgment rule defense, although it does not codify it as a whole.82  
MBCA section 8.31 sets forth the standards of liability for directors.  Similar to 
the Delaware business judgment rule defense, the MBCA begins with a 
presumption that a director is not liable “for any decision to take or not to take 
action, or any failure to take any action.”83  The MBCA then states that a plaintiff 
may rebut that presumption by showing that the director breached the fiduciary 
duties of good faith, care, or loyalty.84  Only the duty of loyalty portion of the 
MBCA regarding a director’s independence, however, shifts the burden of proof 
to the director.85  Even then the director must show only that the “challenged 
conduct was reasonably believed by the director to be in the best interests of the 
corporation,” not that the transaction was fair to the corporation as required by 
Delaware law.86 
 Thus, like Delaware’s business judgment rule defense, the MBCA starts 
with a presumption against liability that the plaintiff must rebut by showing that 
the director breached a fiduciary duty.  Regardless of whether a state follows the 
MBCA or the common law formulation of the business judgment rule defense, 
                                                                                                                
805, 813 (Del. 1984) overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 
2000).   
78. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–
17 (Del. 2000) (stating that to rebut the business judgment rule presumption, the 
shareholder must “provide evidence that the defendant board of directors, in reaching its 
challenged decision, breached any one of its ‘triad of fiduciary duties’”). 
79. See, e.g., Paglin v. Saztec Int’l, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1184, 1200 (W.D. Mo. 1993) 
(illegality and fraud); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) 
(fraud); In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 73–74 (waste); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 
335–36 (Del. Ch. 1997) (same; defining waste as “a transfer of corporate assets that serves 
no corporate purpose” or “for which no consideration at all is received”). 
80. McMullin, 765 A.2d at 916–17; Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 
569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989). 
81. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90–91 (Del. 2001); see also In re Walt 
Disney, 906 A.2d at 52. 
82. MBCA § 8.31 cmt. (noting that the MBCA “does not codify the business 
judgment rule as a whole” but that “its principal elements . . . are embedded in” 
§ 8.31(a)(2)). 
83. Id. § 8.31(a). 
84. Id. § 8.31(a)(2); see infra Part II.C. 
85. See id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iii)(B). 
86. Compare id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iii)(B), with In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 52. 
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judges invoke the defense to protect boards of directors from legal liability in the 
vast majority of shareholder derivative actions.87  
 
 
C. U.S. States Impose Fiduciary Duties on Directors Through Common Law 
or Statutes 
 
In the United States, directors are often said to owe a triad of fiduciary 
duties: a duty of care, a duty of loyalty, and a duty of good faith.88  In Delaware, 
directors’ fiduciary duties were created by the courts and are still embodied solely 
within the common law.89  In states adopting the MBCA, these fiduciary duties are 
imposed by statute.90  As demonstrated below, Delaware common law and the 
MBCA formulate the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith using 
different language, but they share many similarities.  Although directors 
theoretically face personal liability for breaches of fiduciary duties under both 
Delaware common law and the MBCA, directors’ financial liability for breaching 
their fiduciary obligations is effectively eliminated through the combined use of 
indemnification agreements and insurance.91  
 
                                                 
87. See Fairfax, supra note 58, at 409 (arguing that “the tremendous deference courts 
grant to board decisions means that courts hold directors liable for only the most egregious 
examples of director misconduct”); see also TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: 
AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 183–84 (2006) (noting “the historical 
strong protection of corporate boards”); Coffee, supra note 49, at 9 (noting that the rare 
shareholder derivative lawsuits in which judges reach the merits are overwhelmingly 
decided in the defendant’s favor).  
88. See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–17 (Del. 2000); Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
89. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 746–48, 749–51 (referencing case law 
for the standards governing directors’ fiduciary duties); Jennifer O’Hare, Director 
Communications and the Uneasy Relationship Between the Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure 
and the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Law, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 475, 510 
(2002) (“The common law of fiduciary duty is the primary means used to ensure that 
directors of a state-created entity are acting with ‘due care, good faith, and loyalty.’”). 
90. MBCA §§ 8.30–8.31. 
91. Fairfax, supra note 58, at 412; Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 784 (2011) (noting that “directors are shielded from personal 
liability”); Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1055, 
1070–74 (2006) (noting that in a comprehensive study of outside director liability, only 
thirteen cases imposed personal liability on directors of public companies in the course of 
twenty-five years of Securities Exchange Commission enforcement actions, securities class 
action lawsuits, and shareholder derivative lawsuits; only three of the thirteen cases 
involved fiduciary duty breaches); Eric J. Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A 
Critical Assessment of the Delaware Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209, 246 (2011) 
(noting that directors avoid personal liability, while corporations must pay the costs of 
litigation, settlements, and insurance).  
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1. The Fiduciary Duty of Care 
 
 Delaware courts have stated that the duty of care requires directors to 
“use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in 
similar circumstances.”92  In analyzing alleged duty of care breaches, however, 
Delaware courts focus only on procedural due care, meaning they review alleged 
duty of care breaches based on the process by which the board made its decision 
and not the decision’s merits.93  Directors thus breach their duty of care by failing 
“to act in an informed and deliberate manner” when they make decisions on 
behalf of their corporation.94  The effect of this process-oriented focus is that 
courts “insulate directors from liability whenever they make even a modest 
attempt to follow the appropriate formalities.”95  
 Delaware courts further minimize the duty of care by requiring that 
“deficiencies in the directors’ process are actionable only if the directors’ actions 
are grossly negligent.”96  Gross negligence is defined as a “‘reckless indifference 
to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders’ or actions which 
are ‘without the bounds of reason.’”97  The combined effect of the focus on 
procedural due care and the gross negligence standard is that Delaware courts 
rarely hold directors liable for breaching their duty of care.98 
                                                 
92. In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 749; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (stating, 
“[D]irectors have a duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all 
material information reasonably available to them”); see also Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 
132, 147 (1891) (stating that directors have a duty to “supervise the business with 
attention”). 
93. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874–88 (Del. 1985); see also In re 
Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)(“[W]hether a 
judge . . . believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through 
‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational,’ provides no ground for director liability, so long as 
the court determines that the process employed was either rational or employed in a good 
faith effort to advance corporate interests.”). 
94. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873. 
95. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral 
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1790 (2001); Branson, supra note 
66, at 639–40 (“[C]ritics of the modern business judgment rule say that insistence on 
formal decisions places a premium on play acting and on paper trails.  It does not improve 
the quality of decisions that are made.”). 
96. In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 749. 
97. Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7861, 1990 WL 42607, at *12 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990) (quoting Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 
1929)). 
98. In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 750 (“[D]uty of care violations are rarely found”); 
J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: Contractarians, Waiver of 
Liability Provisions, and the Race to the Bottom, 42 IND. L. REV. 285, 298 (2009) 
(“Delaware courts simply did not find violations of the duty of care.  Directors confronted 
little or no risk of liability for ordinary business decisions.  Only suits alleging conflicts of 
interest had any realistic hope of success.”).  Cf. Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s 
Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business 
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 The rare example is Smith v. Van Gorkom, in which the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that the directors violated the duty of care by not adequately 
investigating a merger offer.99  In Van Gorkom, the court held that the business 
judgment rule defense does not protect an uninformed decision and that directors 
may be held to have breached the duty of care if the plaintiff shows that they were 
grossly negligent in failing to inform themselves of all material and reasonably 
available information.100  The impact of Van Gorkom was minimized by the 
Delaware Legislature’s subsequent enactment of section 102(b)(7), which permits 
corporations to limit or entirely eliminate directors’ monetary liability for duty of 
care breaches.101  All states have now enacted statutes allowing corporations to 
limit or eliminate directors’ liability for duty of care breaches.102  
 In Delaware, directors’ duty of care also traditionally included an 
obligation to oversee the corporation,103 and courts could impose liability for “a 
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight.”104  For 
example, in the seminal case of In re Caremark International Derivative 
Litigation, the plaintiffs asserted that the board of directors breached its fiduciary 
duty of care by failing to monitor the conduct of its employees for compliance 
with federal law.105  The plaintiffs claimed that this oversight failure led to a 
government investigation and federal indictment for multiple felonies against 
Caremark, as well as Caremark subsequently paying civil and criminal fines 
totaling $250 million.106  The court stated that directors are responsible for 
ensuring “that information and reporting systems exist . . . that are reasonably 
designed to provide . . . accurate information sufficient to allow . . . informed 
judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business 
performance.”107  In 2006, however, the Delaware Supreme Court appears to have 
                                                                                                                
Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 591 nn.1–2 (1983) (noting only seven cases holding 
directors liable for all breaches of fiduciary duty other than self-interested transactions).  
99. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874. 
100. Id. at 872. 
101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2008); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
663 A.2d 1156, 1166 n.18 (Del. 1995) (noting that  § 102(b)(7) was enacted in response to 
Van Gorkom); Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU 
L. REV. 353, 369 (2004) (Van Gorkom “motivated the Delaware legislature . . . to enact 
legislation that allowed Delaware corporations to exempt directors from monetary damages 
for breaches of the duty of care.”). 
102. Fairfax, supra note 58, at 412; Brown & Gopalan, supra note 98, at 288 (noting 
that all states allow companies to eliminate monetary damages for breach of the duty of 
care); id. at 310 (describing the different provisions adopted by states). 
103. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); see also In 
re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
104. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. 
105. Id. at 964. 
106. Id. at 960–61. 
107. Id. at 970. 
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reclassified oversight claims as a breach of the duty of loyalty.108  In Stone v. 
Ritter,109 the Delaware Supreme Court stated that a showing of bad-faith conduct 
“is essential to establish director oversight liability” and then held that “the 
fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is the duty of loyalty.”110  Thus, Delaware 
still recognizes oversight claims as a breach of fiduciary duty, but that fiduciary 
duty is now loyalty rather than care.111 
 Similar to Delaware common law, the MBCA’s standards of conduct 
state that directors “shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like 
position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.”112  
Like Delaware courts, the MBCA also focuses on the process a director used in 
making a decision, rather than the merits of the decision; it does so by examining 
whether the director was reasonably informed.113  However, the MBCA imposes 
liability only if the plaintiff proves that the director “did not reasonably believe” 
the challenged decision was in the corporation’s best interests or “was not 
informed to an extent the director reasonably believed appropriate in the 
circumstances.”114  The MBCA thus focuses on what the particular director 
reasonably believed, rather than what a reasonable person in the director’s 
position would believe.  The wording of this MBCA provision seems intended to 
insulate directors from liability.  
 This intent to insulate directors from liability for alleged duty of care 
breaches is affirmed by the different language chosen to describe the standard for 
a duty of care claim alleging lack of oversight.  For an oversight claim, the MBCA 
adopted the reasonable director standard by requiring the plaintiff to establish that: 
 
[T]he challenged conduct consisted or was the result of . . . a 
sustained failure of the director to devote attention to ongoing 
oversight of the business and affairs of the corporation, or a 
failure to devote timely attention, by making (or causing to be 
made) appropriate inquiry, when particular facts and 
circumstances of significant concern materialize that would alert 
a reasonably attentive director to the need therefor . . . .115 
 
The MBCA’s use of “a reasonably attentive director” standard for oversight 
claims contrasts with its focus on the particular director’s belief in customary duty 
                                                 
108. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006); Martin Petrin, Assessing 
Delaware’s Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and Theory Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 433, 444–47 (2011). 
109. Stone, 911 A.2d at 362. 
110. Id. at 370. 
111. But see Petrin, supra note 108, at 447–50 (noting that Stone v. Ritter created 
many doctrinal uncertainties that have not yet been resolved). 
112. MBCA § 8.30(b). 
113. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(ii)(B). 
114. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(ii). 
115. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iv). 
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of care cases and supports the proposition that directors are likely insulated from 
liability for an alleged breach of the duty of care.  
 Therefore, the MBCA’s emphasis on the challenged director’s beliefs 
likely produces the same effective result as Delaware law: no liability imposed on 
directors for alleged breaches of the duty of care.  However, the MBCA utilizes a 
different path to do so.  It avoids the confusing gross negligence standard of 
Delaware law, but uses a potentially malleable standard that asks what the 
challenged director reasonably believed.  The similarity in effect between 
Delaware law and the MBCA is also evidenced by the rarity of courts finding a 
breach of the duty of care.116  
 
 
2. The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty 
 
 Delaware courts broadly state the duty of loyalty as “mandat[ing] that the 
best interest of the corporation and its shareholders take[] precedence over any 
interest possessed by a director . . . and not shared by the stockholders 
generally.”117  In determining whether directors have breached their duty of 
loyalty, Delaware courts examine whether the directors made decisions 
independently based on the merits of the transaction and whether the directors 
were disinterested in the transaction’s outcome.118  
 According to Delaware law, directors are “interested” in the outcome of a 
transaction when they will receive a personal benefit from it that is not equally 
shared by the shareholders.119  Such benefit includes any “substantial benefit from 
supporting a transaction” and thus need not be monetary.120  Examples of 
interestedness include self-dealing, insider trading, payment of excessive 
compensation, usurpation of corporate opportunities, and competition with the 
corporation.121 
                                                 
116. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. 2006) 
(“[D]uty of care violations are rarely found.”); Fairfax, supra note 58, at 407–08 (“Over the 
last twenty years, a variety of mechanisms have contributed to a virtual elimination of legal 
liability for directors who breach their duty of care under state law.”).  Cf. Cohn, supra note 
98, at 591 nn.1–2 (noting only seven cases holding directors liable for all breaches of 
fiduciary duty other than self-interested transactions). 
117. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). 
118. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 362; see also Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22 
(Del. Ch. 2002) (stating that the business judgment rule is rebutted where a majority of the 
directors either were “interested in the outcome of the transaction or lacked the 
independence to consider objectively whether the transaction was in the best interest of its 
company and all of its shareholders”). 
119. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993). 
120. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 362. 
121. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 306–07, 321–23. 
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 Independence requires that directors base their decisions “entirely on the 
corporate merits of the transaction” and not on personal considerations.122  
Delaware’s common law definition of “independence” focuses primarily on 
family relationships,123 meaning courts assume that a director cannot act 
independently if a family member stands on the other side of the proposed 
corporate transaction.  A director also is not independent if he or she is 
“controlled” by an interested director who has the “unilateral power to decide 
whether the director continues to receive a benefit upon which the director is so 
dependent or is of such subjective material importance that its threatened loss” 
creates doubt as to whether the director can objectively consider the corporate 
merits of the transaction.124  Delaware courts, however, rarely find one director to 
be controlled by another125 and have never found nonfamilial relationships to be 
bias producing.126  As the Delaware Supreme Court has stated, “Allegations of 
mere personal friendship or a mere outside business relationship, standing alone, 
are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a director’s independence.”127  
                                                 
122. Id.; see also Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264 (Del. 2002) 
(“Directors must not only be independent, but must act independently.”); Rales v. 
Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 935 (Del. 1993) (“[T]he board must be able to act free of personal 
financial interest and improper extraneous influences.”). 
123. Telxon, 802 A.2d at 264–65. 
124. Id. at 264; see also Beam ex rel. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004); 
Rales, 634 A.2d at 936. 
125. Branson, supra note 66, at 640 (“Courts are loathe to find that an otherwise 
reputable business person is not his or her own person.”); see also Beam, 845 A.2d at 1052 
(“To create a reasonable doubt about an outside director’s independence, a plaintiff must 
plead facts that would support the inference that because of the nature of a relationship or 
additional circumstances other than the interested director’s stock ownership or voting 
power, the non-interested director would be more willing to risk his or her reputation than 
risk the relationship with the interested director.”). 
126. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1040. 
127. See id.; see also Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 980–81 
(Del. Ch. 2000) (finding that an allegation that a director was controlled by another director 
based on their fifteen-year professional and personal relationship was insufficient to raise a 
reasonable doubt as to independence).  Scholars have criticized Delaware’s definition of 
director independence and proposed alternative approaches.  See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, 
Director Independence and the Duty of Loyalty: Race, Gender, Class, and the Disney-Ovitz 
Litigation, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1011, 1023 (2005) (suggesting an alternative approach to 
assessing director independence that focuses on subordination, including all hierarchical 
and affective relationships between people, and would defeat any claim of independence); 
J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: “Independent” Directors and the 
Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 55–56 (2006–2007) (arguing that 
“Delaware courts do not adequately ensure that directors defined as independent are in fact 
independent” and suggesting changes “to ensure that limits on disloyalty remain in place 
and that fairness continues to matter”); Anthony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of 
Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 293–94 (2009) (analyzing biases that 
directors can neither identify nor control, such as biases in favor of one’s friends, and 
evaluating potential responses to these unconscious biases). 
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 Similar to Delaware common law, but using slightly different language, 
the MBCA imposes liability for a breach of the duty of loyalty when the plaintiff 
establishes that the director was not independent.  Under the MBCA, the plaintiff 
must establish “a lack of objectivity due to the director’s familial, financial or 
business relationship with . . . another person having a material interest in the 
challenged conduct” or the director lacked “independence due to the director’s 
domination or control by” such a person.128  Further, the plaintiff must establish 
that such relationship or domination “could reasonably be expected to have 
affected the director’s judgment respecting the challenged conduct in a manner 
adverse to the corporation.”129  If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a 
reasonable expectation that the relationship or domination affected the director’s 
judgment, then the director bears the burden of proving “that the challenged 
conduct was reasonably believed by the director to be in the best interests of the 
corporation.”130  This burden shifting is similar to Delaware law, which requires 
such a director to prove that the challenged transaction was entirely fair to the 
corporation.131  Although the MBCA’s express inclusion of financial or business 
relationships affecting objectivity is a departure from Delaware law’s focus on 
familial relationships, no court opinion has yet applied the MBCA definition to 
find a director is not independent on the basis of such a relationship.  
 The MBCA also has numerous provisions requiring a director to be 
disinterested.  For instance, the MBCA states that a director may be held liable 
when the plaintiff establishes that the director received “financial benefit to which 
the director was not entitled” or failed “to deal fairly with the corporation and its 
shareholders.”132  The MBCA specifically defines when a director has a 
conflicting interest in a corporate transaction and the conditions for when the 
directors or the shareholders may ratify such transactions.133  It also has a separate 
provision that prohibits directors from usurping the corporation’s business 
opportunities.134  Thus, these provisions largely track Delaware law regarding 
disinterestedness.  In addition to the MBCA, the rules adopted by the NYSE and 
NASDAQ pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 largely follow Delaware 
law in defining when directors of publicly traded corporations are not independent 
and disinterested.135  
                                                 
128. MBCA § 8.31(a)(2)(iii). 
129. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iii)(A). 
130. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iii)(B). 
131. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90–91 (Del. 2001); In re Walt Disney 
Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006). 
132. MBCA § 8.31(a)(2)(v). 
133. Id. §§ 8.60–8.63. 
134. Id. § 8.70. 
135. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j–1(m) (2008); NYSE LISTED 
COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02 (2009), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/ 
(stating that a director is not independent if, among other things, the director has a material 
relationship with the listed company, has been an employee of the listed company within 
the last three years, or has an immediate family member who has been an executive officer 
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3. The Fiduciary Duty of Good Faith 
 
 The duty of good faith is the weakest of the three fiduciary duties.  
Although the term “good faith” appears in early shareholder derivative cases, it 
has never served as a basis for any reported court decision finding directors 
breached a fiduciary duty.136  In 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the 
meaning of the duty of good faith by identifying two categories of bad faith 
fiduciary conduct: 1) “subjective bad faith,” meaning “fiduciary conduct 
motivated by an actual intent to do harm,”137 and 2) “intentional dereliction of 
duty [or] a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities.”138  The Delaware 
Supreme Court again addressed the duty of good faith a year later in a case 
alleging that the directors failed to exercise proper oversight.139  In Stone v. Ritter, 
the court stated that an oversight claim invokes the second category of bad faith 
conduct, but held “the fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is the duty of 
loyalty.”140  Consistent with this interpretation, the court explained that “a failure 
to act in good faith is not conduct that results, ipso facto, in the direct imposition 
of fiduciary liability” but that a “failure to act in good faith may result in liability 
because the requirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary element’ . . . ‘of the 
fundamental duty of loyalty.’”141  It concluded by stating that the duty of “good 
faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same 
footing as the duties of care and loyalty.”142  Thus, although Delaware recognizes 
a duty of good faith, it is now subsumed within the duty of loyalty. 
 Although Delaware common law does not recognize the duty of good 
faith as an independent fiduciary duty, the MBCA may.  The MBCA states that 
liability may be imposed on directors for “action not in good faith.”143  However, 
the MBCA provides no definition of good faith or bad faith conduct, and its duty 
of good faith has not been tested through litigation. 
 
 
                                                                                                                
of the listed company within the last three years); NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULE 
4200(a)(15) (2004) (similar definition). 
136. See Arsht, supra note 72, at 99. 
137. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63–64 (Del. 2006). 
138. Id. at 66–67 (describing this second category as proscribing fiduciary conduct 
that does not involve disloyalty but yet is more culpable than gross negligence). 
139. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364–66 (Del. 2006) (alleging that the directors of 
AmSouth Bancorporation failed to ensure that a reasonable compliance system existed for 
the corporation and its subsidiary bank, because both entities had to pay millions of dollars 
in fines and civil penalties to resolve government investigations into the bank’s failure to 
file federally required Suspicious Activity Reports). 
140. Id. at 369–70. 
141. Id. (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)). 
142. Id. at 370. 
143. MBCA § 8.31(a)(2)(iii) (“A director shall not be liable to the corporation or its 
shareholders . . . unless the party asserting liability in a proceeding establishes that . . . the 
challenged conduct consisted or was the result of . . . action not in good faith . . . .”). 
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III. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
The United Kingdom encompasses four countries: England, Wales, 
Scotland, and Northern Ireland.144  Although the United Kingdom is part of the 
European Union, the European Union has yet to pass any legislation specifically 
tailored for shareholder derivative lawsuits or fiduciary duties.  Thus, the laws of 
the United Kingdom still govern its corporations and shareholder derivative 
litigation. 
Corporate laws in the United Kingdom were originally created through 
common law development by the courts of England.145  England’s first 
codification of its corporate law occurred in 1862146 and was supplemented by 
common law decisions.147  In 2006, the United Kingdom completely revised its 
corporate law and adopted the Companies Act of 2006.148  The current Companies 
Act is the longest statute in the British Parliament’s history at over 700 pages149 
and was implemented in sections over the course of two years.150  The U.K. 
Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform explained the 
rationale for the overhaul:  
 
The United Kingdom was one of the first nations to establish 
rules for the operation of companies.  Today our system of 
company law and corporate governance, setting out the legal 
basis on which companies are formed and run, is a vital part of 
the legal framework within which business is conducted.  As the 
business environment evolves, there is a risk that the legal 
framework can become gradually divorced from the needs of 
companies, in particular the needs of smaller private businesses, 
creating obstacles to ways that companies want and need to 
operate.151 
                                                 
144. Bernard Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 1: 
Substantive Grounds for Liability (Report to the Russian Securities Agency), 2007 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 614, 641. 
145. Katharine Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country 
Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791, 798 (2002); Black et al., supra note 144, at 
641; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 467–84 (1827). 
146. Pistor et al., supra note 145, at 798 (citing Companies Act, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89 
(1862) (Eng.)). 
147. Black et al., supra note 144, at 641. 
148. Explanatory Note, Background to Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 (U.K.), ¶ 3, 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/notes/division/2. 
149. Id.; Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of 
the United Kingdom’s “Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach,” 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 
577, 589 (2007) (“The legislation is the longest in UK parliamentary history.”).  
150. See Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, Explanatory 
Notes, Background ¶ 3, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/notes/ 
division/2.  
151. Id.  
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The Companies Act covers all aspects of corporate law, including formation of 
companies, rights of shareholders (called “members” in U.K. companies), 
appointment and duties of directors, derivative actions, audit requirements, and 
almost every other element of corporate law that one can imagine.152  The prior 
Companies Act included provisions giving minority shareholders a limited ability 
to bring lawsuits for “unfair prejudice,”153 which is similar to direct suits for 
oppression in the United States.  However, it was the Companies Act of 2006 that 
first recognized shareholder derivative lawsuits154 and first codified the directors’ 
fiduciary duties that had been developed at common law.155  
In many respects, U.K. companies are similar to U.S. corporations.  U.K. 
companies have a single board, and shareholders appoint directors to the board.156  
The board then chooses the managers, and the CEO is usually a key figure on the 
board.157  Although the Companies Act contains very few provisions concerning 
board structure,158 the regulations governing publicly listed companies provide 
standards for companies to use in creating their boards of directors.159  One such 
standard requires that half the board be independent nonexecutives, also called 
outside directors.160 
Notwithstanding these similarities, there are key distinctions between 
U.S. corporations and U.K. companies.  For example, U.S. corporations are 
created and governed by state law, rather than federal law.161  Companies in the 
United Kingdom are controlled by federal laws, including the Companies Act.  In 
addition, the Companies Act does not expressly confer managerial power on the 
board in the same way that statutes of U.S. states do.  Under the Companies Act, a 
company’s constitution (or articles of association) specifies the directors’ 
                                                 
152. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 (U.K.). 
153. Companies Act, 1985, c. 46, § 461(2)(c) (U.K.); see also XIAONING LI, A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SHAREHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE ACTIONS 19 (2007). 
154. See infra Part III.A. 
155. Black et al.,  supra note 144, at 661. 
156. Rita Esen, Internal Control Within the Legal Structure of United Kingdom and 
German Companies: Prospects for Change, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 91, 94 (2001); Cheffins & 
Black, supra note 53, at 1400.  
157. Esen, supra note 156, at 94.  
158. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 154–56 (requiring private companies to have at 
least one director and public companies to have at least two directors).  Cf. Klaus J. Hopt & 
Patrick C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe – Recent Development of Internal Corporate 
Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, 1 ECFR 135, 
149 (2004) (discussing the lack of detailed provisions on board structure in the 1985 
Companies Act).  
159. See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2010), 
available at http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/Corporate_Governance/UK 
%20Corp% 20Gov%20Code%20June%202010.pdf.  For discussion of such provisions, see 
Hopt & Leyens, supra note 158, at 149. 
160. See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 159, § A.3.2; Cheffins & Black, 
supra note 53, at 1400; Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 31.  
161. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MBCA § 8.01(b). 
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authority,162 and directors have a statutory duty to “act in accordance with the 
company’s constitution.”163  In practice, company constitutions usually grant 
unlimited management authority to the directors, and unlimited authority is the 
default provision under the Companies Act.164 
The United Kingdom also has a Corporate Governance Code for every 
publicly listed company that “sets out standards of good practice in relation to 
board leadership and effectiveness, remuneration, accountability and relations 
with shareholders.”165  The original code in 2000 was an initiative of the private 
sector, and it was incorporated into the U.K. Listing Rules.166  Subsequent 
revisions are the product of the Financial Reporting Council, a private 
organization funded by the United Kingdom’s accounting and legal professions, 
financial and commerce communities, and government.167  Enforcement of the 
Corporate Governance Code is the responsibility of the United Kingdom Listing 
Authority, which is a government agency charged with regulating the London 
Stock Exchange.168  The Listing Authority sets the Listing Rules, which a 
company, as a matter of contract and statutory law, must abide by in order to be 
traded on the London Stock Exchange.169  In these respects, the U.K. Listing 
Authority is similar to the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).170  The 
Listing Rules require that a listed company either comply or explain why it does 
not comply with the Corporate Governance Code.171  Although both the creation 
and enforcement of the Corporate Governance Code are “complex mixtures of 
private and public action” in the United Kingdom, the trend is toward greater 
government involvement.172 
Section A explains the United Kingdom’s traditionally limited 
recognition of shareholder derivative actions under common law and its 2006 
expansion of such actions in the Companies Act.  It demonstrates the similarities 
                                                 
162. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, pt. 3, § 31.  A company’s constitution includes its 
articles of association, which must be registered with the registrar of companies.  Id. §§ 17, 
9(6). 
163. Id. pt. 10, § 171. 
164. Black et al., supra note 144, at 643.  
165. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 159. 
166. Richard C. Nolan, The Legal Control of Directors’ Conflicts of Interest in the 
United Kingdom: Non-Executive Directors Following the Higgs Report, 6 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRES L. 413, 417 (2005).  
167. Id. at 417–18.  See information about the Financial Reporting Council at 
http://www.frc.org.uk/about/  (last visited Dec. 31, 2011). 
168. Nolan, supra note 166, at 418; John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The 
Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 239 n.20 (2007). 
169. Nolan, supra note 166, at 418. 
170. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2012); Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2012). 
171. Nolan, supra note 166, at 418; Tihir Sarkar et al., An Analysis of the Walker 
Review of Corporate Governance in U.K. Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 127 
BANKING L.J. 242, 249 n.4 (2010).  
172. Nolan, supra note 166, at 418; Sarkar et al., supra note 171, at 249 n.4. 
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between the Companies Act and provisions of state law in the United States.  
Section B then discusses the United Kingdom’s lack of a business judgment rule 
defense similar to that recognized by U.S. states.  Finally, Section C examines the 
fiduciary duties owed by directors at common law and under the current 
Companies Act. 
 
 
A. The United Kingdom Recognized Shareholder Derivative Actions at 
Common Law and Now by Statute 
 
  Although both the United States and England recognized a shareholder 
derivative action at common law, English common law restricted such actions to 
very narrow circumstances.  Under English common law, shareholder derivative 
actions were permitted as a limited exception to the basic proper plaintiff rule.173  
Under the proper plaintiff rule, the company was the proper party to bring a 
lawsuit for director misconduct because directors owed duties to the company 
alone.174  However, because the board decided when a company would sue,175 it 
was not likely to bring a lawsuit against directors, although occasionally new 
directors would bring proceedings when the former directors departed.176  
Common law did permit a shareholder to bring a direct action for a personal 
injury, but the relief could not include any diminution in value resulting from the 
company’s losses.177  
  Recognizing these likely obstacles to remedying corporate wrongdoing, 
courts used their equity power to create a limited exception to the proper plaintiff 
rule that permitted a shareholder to bring a suit on behalf of the company.178  
Shareholder derivative actions were permitted only for acts not ratifiable by a 
simple majority of shareholders, such as where the alleged conduct was illegal, 
ultra vires, fraudulent, or in breach of a special majority requirement.179  In other 
words, this majority rule principle meant that an English court would not 
intervene in routine business matters unless the plaintiff established that the action 
involved nonratifiable conduct.  Further, under English common law, a 
shareholder could initiate a suit only when she owned enough shares to dictate 
                                                 
173. LI, supra note 153, at 19–22 (citing Foss v Harbottle (1843), 67 Eng. Rep. 189, 2 
Hare 461). 
174. Id. 
175. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1404 (citing Mitchell & Hobbs (UK) Ltd v. 
Mill, (1996) 2 B.C.L.C. 102 (Q.B.); Breckland Group Holdings Ltd. v. London & Suffolk 
Props. Ltd., [1989] B.C.L.C. 100 (Ch.)).  
176. Id. (discussing the Equitable Life case, in which, after the company became 
insolvent and the directors were accused of wrongful trading, the post-crisis board initiated 
proceedings against the directors allegedly responsible for the debt).  
177. LI, supra note 153, at 19–22. 
178. Id.; Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1404. 
179. LI, supra note 153, at 19–22; see also Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1404 
(stating that the exceptions included fraud on the minority shareholders, ultra vires conduct, 
and acts requiring a vote by a special majority of the shareholders). 
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voting outcomes180 and only after the board declined to sue.181  This latter 
requirement is similar to the demand requirement in U.S. states.182  In addition, the 
English majority rule principle is similar to the U.S. business judgment rule 
defense because both start with a presumption against review of directors’ 
decisions.  It is also similar in that both operate as a substantive restriction on 
shareholder derivative actions and a procedural standing restriction.  
  Under English common law, minority shareholders had essentially no 
“effective mechanism to protect themselves or the company, or to discipline 
corporate management.”183  The English common law on shareholder derivative 
actions was “regarded as obscure, complex and inaccessible save to lawyers 
specializing in this field.”184  Another commentator stated that “[t]he 
circumstances in which this [derivative suit] can be done under present English 
law are so obscure and difficult to establish that the derivative action is virtually 
non-existent in England.”185  These criticisms helped spur the 2006 reforms of the 
Companies Act. 
There were, and arguably still are, many financial disincentives to 
bringing a shareholder derivative suit in the United Kingdom.  While the United 
Kingdom does not have a contingency fee system, plaintiffs may enter into a 
conditional fee agreement where an attorney can agree to a “no win, no fee” 
arrangement.186  Under such agreements, the lawyer may receive up to 100% of 
his or her hourly fees if the case wins.187  If the plaintiff loses, this conditional fee 
arrangement is similar to U.S. contingency fees because the attorney receives 
nothing.  The conditional fee system, however, “compares poorly with the 
contingency fees that American lawyers receive in the event of a successful 
outcome.”188  Attorneys receive up to 100% of their hourly fees under U.K. 
conditional fee agreements; whereas attorneys receive as much as 40% of 
plaintiffs’ total monetary awards under U.S. contingency fee agreements,189 which 
can exceed the attorneys’ hourly fees.  The limited upside potential of U.K. 
conditional fee agreements means that “a U.S.-style shareholder plaintiffs’ bar” 
has not developed in the United Kingdom.190 
The U.K. “loser pays” rule poses another financial disincentive to 
bringing shareholder derivative lawsuits.191  If the derivative claim fails, the 
                                                 
180. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1404.  
181. Black et al., supra note 53, at 26. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. LI, supra note 153, at 31. 
185. Black et al., supra note 53, at 26.  
186. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1405. 
187. Id. at 1405–06. 
188. Id.  
189. See Brickman, supra note 48, at 706; Fitzpatrick, supra note 48, at 2045 n.9. 
190. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1405. 
191. Id. at 1406.  For the cost structure of bringing suit in the United Kingdom, see 
Civil Procedure Rules [CPR], 1998, S.I. 1998/3231, pts. 43–49 (Eng.).  
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shareholder must pay the defendant’s costs unless the court grants a protective-
costs order requiring the company to reimburse the directors.192  Equitable Life 
Assurance Society v. Bowley193 provides an example of the high financial burden 
that unsuccessful shareholders may bear under the loser pays rule.  Bowley 
involved an insurance company that nearly went bankrupt, and the new directors 
sued the old directors to recover the losses.194  Even though the new directors 
dropped the case mid-trial, the estimated legal expenses were £35 million for 
Equitable Life and £10 million for the defendant directors195 (about $57 million 
and $16 million in U.S. dollars).196  As an additional disincentive, even if the 
shareholder is successful, a court has the discretion not to order defendants to pay 
the shareholder’s legal fees.197  Further, like in the United States, any recovery in a 
successful derivative action will be paid to the company and not to the shareholder 
who initiated the action.198  
In addition to financial disincentives, another reason shareholder 
derivative lawsuits have been uncommon in the United Kingdom is the judiciary’s 
reluctance to hear such cases.  Prior to enactment of the current Companies Act, 
the last derivative suit was the 1981 case of Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. 
Newman Indus. Ltd.199  In that case, a major institutional investor pursued 
derivative litigation against two inside directors who allegedly engaged in a self-
serving transaction.200  The company itself ultimately sued the directors, rendering 
the derivative suit moot.201  Nevertheless, noting that the plaintiffs were 
“pioneering a method of controlling companies,” the Court of Appeals stated that 
the “voluntary regulation of companies is a matter for the [financial district],” and 
the “compulsory regulation of companies is a matter for Parliament.”202  Thus, the 
court was not willing to allow shareholders to use the judicial system as a method 
of regulating companies’ conduct, stating that such regulation was a matter for the 
markets and the legislature. 
                                                 
192. CPR, pt. 44.3(2). 
193. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Bowley¸ [2003] EWHC (Comm) 263, [35]– 
[41], (2004) 1 B.C.L.C. 180, 188–89. 
194. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1399–1400. 
195. Id. at 1407.  
196. For current and historical exchange rates, see http://www.x-rates.com/cgi-
bin/hlookup.cgi (showing that the exchange rate in the late 1990s and early 2000s was 
approximately the same as current exchange rates).  
197. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1406.  
198. Id. at 1407 n.105 (citing Spokes v. The Grosvenor & W. End Ry. Terminus Hotel 
Co. Ltd., (1897) 2 Q.B. 124, 128)). 
199. Prudential Assurance Co. v. Newman Indus. Ltd. (No. 2), (1982) 1 All E.R. 354 
(Ch.). 
200. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1406–07. 
201. Prudential Assurance Co. v. Newman Indus. Ltd. (No. 2), (1982) 1 All E.R. 354 
(Ch.). 
202. Id. 
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In 2006, the Companies Act statutorily altered the common law basis for 
bringing a shareholder derivative suit.203  A derivative claim is defined as a 
proceeding by a member of a company “in respect of a cause of action vested in 
the company, and seeking relief on behalf of the company.”204  Such a claim “may 
be brought only in respect of a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed 
act or omission involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by 
a director of the company.”205  To this extent, the Companies Act tracks U.S. 
derivative law.  However, it does not adopt the standing requirement of U.S. law, 
which requires the shareholder to have owned shares at the time of the challenged 
transaction.  The U.K. law states that “[i]t is immaterial whether the cause of 
action arose before or after the person seeking to bring or continue the derivative 
claim became a member of the company.”206 
The Companies Act also differs with respect to the U.S. demand 
requirement.  It requires a shareholder filing a derivative claim only to “apply to 
the court for permission . . . to continue it.”207  Correspondingly, the U.K. Civil 
Procedure Rules have been amended to require that a shareholder filing a 
derivative claim seek permission of the court to continue and, until the court 
grants permission, to prohibit the shareholder from taking any further action in the 
case except to make an urgent application for interim relief.208  The Companies 
Act then states that the court determines whether the shareholder’s application and 
evidence constitute a prima facie case, and thus whether the case may continue.209  
The court may choose to: dismiss the application; give permission to continue the 
claim on limited terms; or give permission to continue the claim while also 
directing the evidence to be provided by the company and adjourning the 
proceedings to enable the shareholder to obtain evidence.210  Unlike U.S. law, the 
Companies Act permits a shareholder to seek permission to continue a claim 
originally brought by the company when that claim could be pursued 
derivatively.211  It also permits a shareholder to apply to continue a claim 
originally brought by another shareholder.212 
In determining whether to give permission to continue a derivative claim, 
the Companies Act lists specific factors that the court must consider.213  Those 
                                                 
203. This article discusses the provisions of the Companies Act of 2006 applicable to 
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.  For the provisions for derivative actions in 
Scotland, which vary slightly, see Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 265 (U.K.). 
204. Id. § 260(1). 
205. Id. § 260(3). 
206. Id. § 260(4). 
207. Id. § 261(1); see also Kurt A. Goehre, Is the Demand Requirement Obsolete? 
How the United Kingdom Modernized Its Shareholder Derivative Procedure and What the 
United States Can Learn from It, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 140, 142–43 (2010). 
208. CPR 19.9. 
209. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 261(2). 
210. Id. § 261(3–4). 
211. Id. § 262. 
212. Id. § 264. 
213. Id. § 263(3). 
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factors include the applicant’s good faith and the company’s decision not to 
pursue the claim.214  The court also must consider “the importance that a person 
[with a duty to promote the company’s success] would attach to continuing [the 
claim].”215  Similarly, the Companies Act requires that the court give “particular 
regard to any evidence before it as to the views of members of the company who 
have no personal interest, direct or indirect, in the matter.”216  In addition, if the 
alleged act or omission has not yet occurred, the court must consider whether the 
company could, and likely would, authorize it before it occurs or ratify it after it 
occurs.217  If the act or omission has already occurred, the court must consider 
whether it could be, and likely would be, ratified by the company.218  Finally, the 
court is directed to consider whether the claim could be pursued as a direct claim 
rather than a derivative claim.219  
For several of those factors, the Companies Act expressly states that 
permission to continue a derivative claim “must be refused” if that factor is 
satisfied.220  So, if a person with a duty to promote the company’s success “would 
not seek to continue the claim,” the court must refuse permission to continue it.221  
Similarly, the court must refuse permission to continue the claim if the company 
has authorized or ratified the challenged act or omission.222  Thus, to receive 
permission to continue the case, the shareholder essentially must establish at a 
preliminary stage that the challenged conduct has not been authorized or ratified 
by the company and that a director or officer would pursue the claim.223  If the 
court grants leave to continue the derivative claim, a trial on the merits may 
follow.224  
The statutory authorization of shareholder derivative actions in the 
Companies Act has produced mixed reactions.  Some companies, particularly 
those operating within politically sensitive areas, have expressed concern that the 
new law strengthens the rights of those who acquire shares to bring derivative 
actions for the purpose of harassing companies.225  In a 2006 survey of directors of 
public companies, 54% said they were “very concerned” or “quite concerned” that 
the new law would increase the number of claims against directors.226  However, 
no wave of derivative litigation has materialized since the Act was implemented 
                                                 
214. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 263(3)(a), (e). 
215. Id. § 263(3)(b). 
216. Id. § 263(4). 
217. Id. § 263(3)(c). 
218. Id. § 263(3)(d). 
219. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 263(3)(f). 
220. Id. § 263(2). 
221. Id. § 263(2)(a). 
222. Id. § 263(2)(b), (c). 
223. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1405.  
224. Id. 
225. Id.  
226. Id. (quoting HERBERT SMITH, SURVEY RELATED TO DIRECTORS DUTIES AND 
INSURANCE: SUMMARY REPORT (2006)).  
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on October 1, 2007.227  One reason for the paucity of derivative litigation may be 
the new statute’s failure to address the continuing financial disincentives for 
shareholders to bring such lawsuits.228 
Similar to U.S. law, shareholders in the United Kingdom are not limited 
to shareholder derivative suits as the sole means of attempting to control directors’ 
behavior.  Shareholders may bring direct suits when they have experienced “unfair 
prejudice” by the conduct of a company’s affairs,229 which are similar to direct 
suits for oppression by minority shareholders under U.S. law.230  A breach of duty 
by a company’s directors perhaps could be deemed unfair prejudice, but most 
unfair prejudice cases involve the improper diversion of assets or other self-
serving conduct for which the customary remedy is a buy-out at fair value.231  
Shareholders may also bring a suit in their own name under U.K. securities law to 
recover losses caused by false or misleading disclosures for listed companies,232 
which is also similar to U.S. law.233  
The United Kingdom has also sought to increase shareholder power in 
other ways.  It limits the extent to which directors, in the company’s constitution, 
may have the power to validate self-interested transactions.234  For example, 
shareholders must approve payments to directors, loans to directors, and 
substantial property transactions between a company and a director.235  The 
Companies Act also allows the Secretary of State to find that a criminal case may 
be brought against the directors, but such suits are “virtually never prosecuted.”236  
Additionally, a breach of a fiduciary or statutory duty by a director is ground for 
disqualification from future service as a director.237  Finally, the Companies Act 
allows shareholders to remove directors by ordinary resolution at any meeting of 
the company.238  One commentator concludes that these additional mechanisms 
for controlling director conduct mean “that corporate governance in the United 
Kingdom does not so much rely on enforcing managerial care by directors’ 
personal liability, but rather on the danger of removal by ordinary shareholder 
resolution, and in particular as a consequence of a change of corporate control.”239  
Thus, the United Kingdom has sought to strengthen shareholders’ rights through 
these mechanisms as well as through the explicit recognition of shareholder 
                                                 
227. Goehre, supra note 207, at 156.  
228. Black et al., supra note 53, at 28.  
229. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 994. 
230. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
231. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1409.  
232. Id.  
233. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); SEC Rule 10b-5, 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
234. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 41. 
235. Id. §§ 188–226; see also Nolan, supra note 166, at 427.  
236. Nolan, supra note 166, at 430–31.  
237. Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986, c. 46, § 6 (U.K.); see also Nolan, 
supra note 166, at 432.  
238. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 168. 
239. Hopt & Leyen, supra note 158, at 152.  
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derivative actions.  It will take years to assess whether these reforms truly produce 
more effective corporate governance.  
 
 
B. The United Kingdom Lacks a Business Judgment Rule Defense 
 
  Although the United Kingdom has never explicitly recognized a business 
judgment rule defense, the 1985 version of the Companies Act contained a 
provision with language loosely resembling such a defense.240  This provision 
allowed a court to excuse company officials for a breach of duty if the court found 
that they acted “honestly and reasonably” and “ought fairly to be excused.”241  
The current Companies Act, however, does not contain a similar provision.  It also 
expressly states that provisions protecting directors from liability are void: “Any 
provision that purports to exempt a director of a company (to any extent) from any 
liability that would otherwise attach to him in connection with any negligence, 
default, breach of duty or breach of trust in relation to the company is void.”242  
The current Companies Act thus does not appear to recognize any business 
judgment rule defense.  
  Indeed, the United Kingdom does not articulate a statutory or judicially 
created business judgment rule defense similar to the robust defense created by 
U.S. law.243  While U.K. courts presume company officials have acted in good 
faith and require the plaintiff to prove bad faith, this only partially resembles U.S. 
law.244  Nevertheless, English judges have shown that they are reluctant to second-
guess corporate decision-making by directors and have refrained from holding 
directors liable for errors of judgment.245  
 
 
C. The United Kingdom Imposes Fiduciary Duties on Directors at Common 
Law and Now by Statute  
 
The fiduciary duties of directors have both common law and statutory 
bases in the United Kingdom. 
                                                 
240. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 727; see also Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 
1414. 
241. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 727.  
242. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 232(1).  
243. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1401; Black et al., supra note 144, at 681–
82.  
244. Black et al., supra note 144, at 681–82 (“In England, there is a general 
assumption that persons have acted in good faith.  Anyone who alleges bad faith must state 
and prove this claim and do both clearly. . . . The effect of these rules is that bad faith must 
be specifically pleaded, and at trial the claim of bad faith must be supported by evidence: it 
is not to be assumed.”).  
245. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1401; Black et al., supra note 144, at 681–
82.  
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1. Fiduciary Duties Under English Common Law 
 
At common law, United Kingdom directors owed several “core” duties to 
their companies.246  These duties were developed from trust law principles “that 
persons who hold assets or exercise functions in a representative capacity for the 
benefit of other people act in good faith and conscientiously protect the interests 
of those they represent.”247  During the early nineteenth century, the Chancery 
Court extended the fiduciary duties imposed on trustees to agents, promoters, and 
directors of companies.248 
In summarizing the director’s common law duty of care, one court stated 
that a director “undertakes the responsibility of ensuring that he or she 
understands the nature of the duty a director is called upon to perform,” but noted 
“[t]hat duty will vary according to the size and business of the particular company 
and the experience that the director held himself or herself out to have in support 
of appointment to the office.”249  In In re D’Jan of London Ltd., the court more 
broadly defined a director’s duty of care as requiring both “the general 
knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person” in 
the director’s position and “the general knowledge, skill and experience that that 
director has.”250  Regardless of the exact definition, the United Kingdom’s 
common law duty of care consistently emphasized context as well as director 
knowledge and diligence.  Although the duty of care definition is similar to U.S. 
law, the United Kingdom culpability standard is negligence rather than the 
Delaware gross negligence standard.251  
The duty of loyalty under English common law also developed from the 
law of trusts.252  It focused on a director’s obligation to act in the corporation’s 
best interests and to avoid conflicts of interests with the corporation.253  Although 
English courts refrained from exhaustively defining a conflict of interest, the cases 
reflect that a conflict of interest exists when a financial factor may tempt a director 
                                                 
246. ROBERT R. PENNINGTON, DIRECTORS’ PERSONAL LIABILITY 34 (1987). 
247. Id.  
248. Id.; L.C.B. GOWER ET AL., GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 572 
(4th ed., 1979).  
249. In re Barings plc (No. 5), [1999] 1 B.C.L.C. 433, 488b (“The extent of the duty, 
and the question whether it has been discharged, must depend on the facts of each 
particular case, including the director’s role in the management of the company.”); Black et 
al., supra note 144, at 661 n.50. 
250. In re D’Jan of London Ltd., [1993] BCLC 646, 648; Black et al., supra note 144, 
at 662. 
251. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1401.  
252. Rebecca Lee, Fiduciary Duty Without Equity: “Fiduciary Duties” of Directors 
Under the Revised Company Law of the PRC , 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 897, 911 (2007); PAUL L. 
DAVIES ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 16–63, 557–74 (8th ed. 2008). 
253. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 252, at 16–63, 557–74; Brian Cheffins, Does Law 
Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 459, 469 (2001) (“With respect to a duty of loyalty, English courts obliged directors 
to act in a company’s best interests and to avoid conflicts of interest.”). 
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to favor that interest at the company’s expense.254  A court could find a breach of 
the duty of loyalty even if the challenged transaction was fair and reasonable.255  
However, under common law, companies could avoid liability by adopting 
exculpatory clauses in the corporate constitution or by having shareholders ratify a 
conflict-of-interest transaction.256 
While there were judicially created duties of care and loyalty, some 
commentators argue that there was not a common law duty of good faith; rather, 
plaintiffs had to prove bad faith.257  In In Re Smith & Fawcett, the court found that 
bad faith involves the director’s conscious intention to deviate from the duty to act 
in the company’s best interests.258  However, a duty of good faith has long been 
assumed to apply to directors once they take their appointment, because they are 
fiduciaries and must display the utmost good faith toward the company in their 
dealings with it or on its behalf.259  In this sense, good faith is tested on a 
common-sense standard with the “court asking itself whether it is proved that the 
directors have not done what they honestly believe to be right, and normally 
accepting that they have unless satisfied that they have not behaved as honest men 
of business might be expected to act.”260 
In addition, the United Kingdom did not traditionally make a formal legal 
distinction between the duties of executive and nonexecutive directors.  The role 
of nonexecutive directors, however, may have been judicially altered.261  In 2001, 
the court in In Re Continental Assurance Co. of London plc stated that while 
directors have a responsibility to oversee the company’s activities, those 
responsibilities do not “require the non-executive directors to overrule the 
specialist directors, like the finance director, in their specialist fields.”262  Two 
years later, the court in Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Bowley held that “the 
duty owed in law by a non-executive director to a company . . . does not differ 
from the duty owed by an executive director but in application it may and usually 
will do so.”263  The Companies Act was revised subsequent to these cases, but it 
also draws no formal distinction between executive and nonexecutive directors. 
 
                                                 
254. Black et al., supra note 144, at 705.  
255. Cheffins, supra note 253, at 469–70. 
256. Id.; see also Nolan, supra note 166, at 424 (“English law allows a company’s 
constitution to modify directors’ fiduciary obligations so that they can be waived ex ante by 
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decision and always provided that the decision is made bone fide in the best interests of the 
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257. Black et al., supra note 144, at 664. 
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259. GOWER, supra note 248, at 575; Black et al., supra note 144, at 663.  
260. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 252, at 601.  
261. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1400.  
262. Id. (quoting Re Cont’l Assurance Co. of London plc, [2001] B.P.I.R. 733, 850 
(Ch.)).  
263. Id. at 1400 n.51 (quoting Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Bowley¸ [2003] 
EWHC (Comm) 263, [35]–[41], (2004) 1 B.C.L.C. 180, 188–89). 
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2. Fiduciary Duties Under the Companies Act of 2006  
 
The Companies Act mandates that directors of U.K. companies comply 
with numerous new provisions regulating directors’ conduct.264  For example, 
directors must “act in accordance with the company’s constitution.”265  It also 
clarified the fiduciary duties traditionally owed by directors.  These U.K. fiduciary 
obligations are analogous to corporate statutes in U.S. states, as discussed below. 
The Companies Act requires directors to “exercise reasonable care, skill 
and diligence.”266  The statute then defines this term as meaning “the care, skill 
and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with (a) the 
general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a 
person” in the director’s position, and “(b) the general knowledge, skill and 
experience that that director has.”267  This definition incorporates almost verbatim 
the definition stated by the court in In re D’Jan of London Ltd.268  It also closely 
resembles the definition of the duty of care under U.S. law, including Delaware 
common law and the MBCA provision adopted by a majority of U.S. states.  
The Companies Act also obligates a director to “act in the way he 
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole.”269  The director must 
consider the likely long-term consequences of the decision; the interests of 
employees; the business relationships with suppliers, customers, and others; the 
impact on the community and the environment; the desirability of “maintaining a 
reputation for high standards of business conduct”; and the need to treat members 
fairly.270  This duty is subject to any law “requiring directors, in certain 
circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company.”271 
The current Companies Act states a duty of loyalty that resembles the 
MBCA provisions enacted by a majority of U.S. states in that it requires directors 
to act independently and disinterestedly.  However, while it requires directors to 
“exercise independent judgment,” it fails to offer any definition of independent 
judgment.272  In section 175, the Companies Act more clearly outlines a director’s 
duty to avoid both direct and indirect interests that conflict or may conflict with 
the company’s interests, including the “exploitation of any property, information 
or opportunity.”273  However, section 175 lessens the duty to avoid conflicts of 
                                                 
264. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1402.  For the duties of company directors, 
see Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 154–259. 
265. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 171. 
266. Id. § 174(1). 
267. Id. § 174(2). 
268. In Re D’Jan of London Ltd., [1993] BCLC 646, 648; Black et al., supra note 144, 
at 662. 
269. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172(1). 
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271. Id. § 172(3). 
272. Id. § 173. 
273. Id. § 175(1), (2). 
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interest by stating that the duty is not infringed if “the situation cannot reasonably 
be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest.”274  It also states that the 
duty is not infringed if the directors have properly authorized the conflict.275  
Section 176 of the Companies Act also clearly states that directors owe a duty not 
to accept benefits from third parties on account of their position or actions as 
directors.276  However, like section 175, it then lessens this duty by stating that it 
“is not infringed if the acceptance of the benefit cannot reasonably be regarded as 
likely to give rise to a conflict of interest.”277 
Similar to the MBCA, section 177 of the Companies Act requires a 
director to declare to the other directors any direct or indirect interest in a 
proposed transaction with the company “before the company enters into the 
transaction.”278  The declaration must include the nature and extent of the 
director’s interest,279 and it must be updated if the declaration of interest later 
becomes inaccurate or incomplete.280  Although section 177 excuses a director 
from declaring an interest of which the director is not aware, it states that “a 
director is treated as being aware of matters of which he ought reasonably to be 
aware.”281  Similar to sections 175 and 176, however, section 177 lessens this duty 
by stating that a director need not declare an interest “if it cannot reasonably be 
regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest” or if the “other directors are 
already aware of it.”282  The Companies Act thus makes it fairly simple for 
directors to avoid a breach of the duty of loyalty.  
To enforce these general fiduciary duties, the Companies Act added 
provisions expressly allowing civil lawsuits for breaches of these duties.283  Like 
the MBCA, the Companies Act states that where a director has complied with the 
duty to avoid conflicts of interest or the duty to declare any interest in a proposed 
transaction by authorization of the directors, then the transaction “is not liable to 
be set aside by virtue of any common law rule or equitable principle requiring the 
consent or approval of the members of the company.”284  A separate chapter of the 
Companies Act requires the consent or approval of the corporation’s members in 
certain circumstances; compliance with the general duties does not remove the 
                                                 
274. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 175(4). 
275. Id. § 175(4); see also id. § 175(5) (stating that a private company’s directors may 
authorize a conflict where “nothing in the company’s constitution invalidates such 
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need for such approval.285  It further states that these general duties are subject to 
any rule of law enabling the company to alter the duties owed by directors.286  
Unlike the statutes of U.S. states, however, the Companies Act does not allow a 
company’s constitution to exempt directors from liability for breach of duty.287  
U.K. shareholders may only excuse, on a case-by-case basis, a breach that does 
not involve misappropriation of corporate assets or fraud.288  Because the key 
provisions in the Companies Act regarding directors’ fiduciary duties and civil 
remedies for breaches of those duties were fully implemented only in October 
2007, there is no case law concerning derivative lawsuits under these new 
provisions. 
 
 
IV. CANADA 
 
Canada has a federal legal system in which each province has authority 
to determine its laws as specified in the Canadian Constitution.  The federal 
government enacted the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) in 1975, but 
this is an optional law.289  Each province is free to enact its own corporate law, 
and firms may choose to be governed by the laws of a province or the CBCA.290  
Most Canadian provinces have either copied or closely imitated the CBCA in their 
corporate governance laws.291  
Like the United States and the United Kingdom, corporations in Canada 
have a single board of directors,292 and directors are elected by the shareholders.293  
Canada previously recognized shareholder derivative lawsuits at common law, 
which followed the English common law rules.294  In the 1970s, Canada 
experienced significant corporate law reform leading to the CBCA.295  Today, 
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Canada authorizes shareholder derivative actions in the CBCA, which is described 
in Section A.  Section B explains that Canada recognizes a business judgment rule 
defense that is more limited than that of U.S. states.  Section C then discusses 
Canada’s evolution of directors’ duties from common law to the current statutory 
rules, which are also similar to those recognized by U.S. states.  
 
 
A. Canada Statutorily Authorizes Shareholder Derivative Litigation 
 
Similar to the U.K. Companies Act, the CBCA requires a shareholder to 
apply to the court for leave to bring an action on behalf of the corporation.296  It 
also permits a shareholder, upon application, to intervene in an action to which the 
corporation is a party.297  For the court to grant leave for a shareholder derivative 
action, the following conditions must be met: a) the shareholder gave notice to the 
company fourteen days before making the application if the company did “not 
bring, diligently prosecute or defend or discontinue the action”; b) the shareholder 
“is acting in good faith”; and c) the action is in the company’s interests.298  This 
procedure resembles that of the U.K. Companies Act.  While also similar to the 
U.S. demand requirement in that the shareholder must give notice to the board, 
under the CBCA, the court decides whether the action may continue.  
Also, like the U.K. Companies Act, the CBCA gives the court broad 
authority to make any order, at any time, in a shareholder derivative action that it 
thinks fit.299  These orders may: authorize the shareholder or another person to 
control the action; give directions for the action’s conduct; direct a defendant to 
pay any judgment directly to former and present shareholders, instead of to the 
corporation; and require the corporation to pay the shareholder’s reasonable legal 
fees.300  Commentators have found that “this statutory derivative action procedure 
has been sporadic, however, particularly when self-serving conduct has been 
lacking and a public company has been involved.”301  
Although Canada permits shareholder derivative lawsuits, several 
financial disincentives may deter shareholders from bringing derivative lawsuits.  
At least one of these disincentives has been alleviated.  Canada historically 
prohibited contingency fees by common law and statute, but such fees are now 
permitted in most jurisdictions in Canada just as they are in the United States.302  
                                                 
296. Canada Business Corporations Act [CBCA], R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 239 (Can.), 
available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-44/index.html. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. § 240. 
300. Id.  
301. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1443.  
 302. Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 122 (2001); 
Caroline Davidson, Tort Au Canadien: A Proposal for Canadian Tort Legislation on Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights & Humanitarian Law, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1403, 1443 (2005). 
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However, various financial disincentives remain.  First, any recovery in a 
successful derivative action will be paid to the company just as it is in the United 
States and United Kingdom.303  Second, Canada follows the English “loser pays” 
rule, which requires the losing party to pay at least some of the successful party’s 
legal costs.304  Thus, a shareholder who applies for leave to pursue a derivative 
action and fails or who goes to trial and loses may be ordered by the court to pay 
the other side’s legal costs.  Even if ultimately successful, the shareholder must 
initially pay the costs because courts are reluctant to order companies to pay 
expenses until after final disposition.305  Third, unlike in the United States where a 
settlement may provide for attorney’s fees, Canada does not authorize settlements 
for payment directly from the company to the shareholders’ lawyers.306  The court 
may make an order requiring the corporation to pay the legal fees incurred by a 
shareholder in a derivative suit.307  The parties, however, cannot privately agree to 
a settlement because court approval is required to discontinue a derivative suit,308 
and the court is unlikely to approve a settlement where the company agrees to pay 
fees unless the court has previously made a specific order.309  
In addition, like the direct shareholder lawsuits for oppression under the 
laws of the United States and those for unfair prejudice in the United Kingdom, 
Canada permits shareholders to bring a direct lawsuit for relief on the grounds of 
unfair prejudice.310  These suits, however, are not common for Canadian public 
companies because the “equitable rights” that usually underlie a successful direct 
claim are less likely to arise in a public company than a private company.311  
 
 
B. Canada Recognizes Limited Defenses for Directors by Statute and at 
Common Law 
 
In 2001, Canada amended the CBCA to expressly include limited 
defenses for directors.  The CBCA provides that a director is not liable for an 
alleged breach of the duty of care if the director has “exercised the care, diligence 
and skill that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in comparable 
circumstances.”312  Although limited to the duty of care, this provision is 
comparable to the business judgment rule recognized by Delaware and the MBCA 
adopted by many U.S. states.  The CBCA further provides that a director is not 
liable for a breach of the duty of care or good faith if the director relied in good 
                                                 
303. Kaplan & Elwood, supra note 294, at 457.  
304. Black et al., supra note 53, at 14.  
305. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1444.  
306. See Black et al., supra note 53, at 14. 
307. CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 240(d). 
308. Id. § 242(2). 
309. Black et al., supra note 53, at 14.  
310. CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 241. 
311. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1444.  
312. CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, §§ 123(4). 
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faith on a) financial statements by a corporate officer or a written report of the 
corporation’s auditor represented “fairly to reflect the financial condition of the 
corporation,” or b) a report of a professional “whose profession lends credibility” 
to it.313  This narrow provision, excusing liability for good faith reliance on the 
corporation’s financial statements or reports by professionals, correlates to 
provisions contained in Delaware’s statutes and the MBCA.314 
While these statutory defenses amount to a limited formulation of the 
business judgment rule, several Canadian courts had previously recognized a form 
of judicial deference to directors’ business decisions similar to it.  For example, in 
duty of care cases, Canadian courts have stated that they are reluctant to find a 
breach of fiduciary duty “simply because a business decision went badly 
wrong.”315  In a 1998 case, Maple Leaf Foods v. Schneider Corp., the Ontario 
Court of Appeals stated that it reviews whether “the directors made a reasonable 
decision not a perfect decision.”316  If the decision falls “within a range of 
reasonableness, the court ought not to substitute its opinion for that of the board 
even though subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s 
determination.”317  Similarly, in CW Shareholdings Inc. v. WIC Western 
International Communications Ltd., that same court stated a deferential judicial 
standard for business decisions: “[T]he court should be reluctant to substitute its 
own opinion for that of the directors where the business decision was made in 
reasonable and informed reliance on the advice of financial and legal advisors 
appropriately retained and consulted in the circumstances.”318  Thus, even without 
the statutory defense, Canadian courts commonly gave deference to directors’ 
business decisions when the shareholders alleged a breach of the duty of care.  
To the extent these courts recognized a limited business judgment rule 
defense, they did so without expressly adopting the U.S. formulation of it.319  
After the CBCA was amended, however, the Supreme Court of Canada expressly 
adopted a business judgment rule defense for the duty of care that closely mimics 
the U.S. rule.320  In People’s Department Stores v. Wise, a bankruptcy action in 
                                                 
313. Id. §§ 123(4–5).  
314. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e); MBCA § 8.30(e), (f). 
315. See Black et al., supra note 144, at 675–77. 
316. Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp., [1998] 42 O.R. 3d 177 (Can. Ont. 
C.A.).  
317. Id.  
318. CW Shareholdings Inc. v. WIC Western International Communications Ltd., 
[1998] 39 O.R. 3d 755 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.); O’Brien, supra note 295, at n.20.  
319. Black et al., supra note 144, at 676–77 (“Canadian courts, like their English 
counterparts, traditionally refrained from articulating or applying a specific business 
judgment rule.”).  Cf. Kenneth G. Ottenbreit & John E. Walker, Learning from the 
Delaware Experience: A Comparison of the Canada Business Corporations Act and the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, 29 CAN. BUS. L.J. 364, 370 (1998) (noting that 
Canada, unlike Delaware, lacked a “broad base of judicial decisions” upon which to base a 
business judgment rule defense).  
320. See Pamela L.J. Huff & Russell C. Silbergleid, From Production Resources to 
People’s Department Stores: A Similar Response by Delaware and Canadian Courts on the 
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which the directors were alleged to have breached a duty of care, the court stated a 
business judgment rule type of defense:321  
 
Courts are ill-suited and should be reluctant to second-guess the 
application of business expertise to the considerations that are 
involved in corporate decision making, but they are capable, on 
the facts of any case, of determining whether an appropriate 
degree of prudence and diligence was brought to bear in 
reaching what is claimed to be a reasonable business decision at 
the time it was made.322 
 
The court noted that the risk of hindsight bias had led lower Canadian courts to 
develop “a rule of deference to business decisions.”323  Thus, after Wise, directors 
must “act prudently and on a reasonably informed basis,” and their decisions need 
not be perfect but “must be reasonable business decisions in light of all the 
circumstances about which the directors . . . knew or ought to have known.”324  
The Canadian business judgment rule differs from the U.S. rule because 
it applies only to cases in which the court is deciding “whether the directors have 
met their duty of care, diligence, and skill.”325  It does not apply when a plaintiff is 
alleging that directors breached their duty to act in the company’s best interests 326 
or when a transaction involves a conflict of interest.327  In addition, the Canadian 
business judgment rule differs from the U.S. rule in that Canadian courts will 
analyze both the process leading to the business decision and the decision itself in 
deciding whether the directors made a reasonable choice.328  If the court finds that 
the decision falls within the range of reasonableness, it will not substitute its 
                                                                                                                
Fiduciary Duties of Directors to Creditors of Insolvent Companies, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 
455 (2007) (noting the similarity between the Canadian decision in Wise and a later U.S. 
court decision).  
321. People’s Dep’t Stores v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.); see also Gevurtz, 
supra note 54, at 468.  
322. People’s Dep’t Stores v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.). 
323. Id.; see also Huff & Silbergleid, supra note 320, at 492; O’Brien, supra note 295, 
at n.20 (stating that “directors’ actions are not to be judged against the perfect vision of 
hindsight” and “should be measured against the facts as they existed at the time the 
impugned decision was made” (citing CW Shareholdings Inc. v. WIC W. Int’l Commc’ns 
Ltd., [1998] 39 O.R. 3d 755 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.)).  
324. People’s Dep’t Stores v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.). 
325. Id.; Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp., [1998] 42 O.R.3d 177 (Can. Ont. 
C.A.).  
326. See People’s Dep’t Stores, 3 S.C.R. 461; CW Shareholdings Inc. v. WIC W. Int’l 
Commc’ns Ltd., [1998], 39 O.R. 3d 755 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.); see also Black et al., supra 
note 144, at 677. 
327. Black et al., supra note 144, at 677–78. 
328. Id. 
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opinion for that of the directors.329  Thus, this limited Canadian business judgment 
rule defense replicates only the portion of the U.S. rule concerning alleged 
breaches of the duty of care, for which U.S. states permit corporations to eliminate 
any liability.  
 
 
C. Canada Imposes Fiduciary Duties on Directors at Common Law and Now 
by Statute 
 
Directors’ fiduciary duties originated in common law cases in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  As stated by the Canadian Supreme 
Court, a fiduciary relationship requires “loyalty, good faith and avoidance of a 
conflict of duty and self-interests.”330  Courts imposed a limited and subjective 
standard of competence on directors, requiring them “to act with only the skill and 
care that could be expected of the particular director, given that individual’s 
knowledge and experience.”331  Under common law, directors were not liable for 
errors of judgment and were not obligated to continuously pay attention to the 
company’s affairs or attend directors’ meetings.  
The CBCA provides the current basis for directors’ fiduciary duties.  
Similar to U.S. law, the CBCA articulates a standard for the duty of care that 
requires directors to “exercise the care, diligence and skill” of a “reasonably 
prudent person.”332  Contrary to the objective standard recognized by U.S. law, 
however, the standard articulated in the CBCA is “a reasonably prudent person in 
comparable circumstances.”333  The addition of the “in comparable 
circumstances” phrase has been interpreted as maintaining the common law 
subjective standard of diligence, care, and skill.  For example, in Neil Soper v. Her 
Majesty the Queen, the Court of Appeals for Ottawa analyzed the Income Tax 
Act’s section 227.1(3) requiring a director to exercise “due diligence” in 
complying with tax laws, which the court found to be similar to the CBCA’s duty 
of care standard.334  The court held that the duties of diligence, skill, and care 
stated in the CBCA are subjective.335  It explained that the “[u]se of ‘in 
comparable circumstances’ indicates that a reasonably prudent person in 
comparable circumstances may be an unskilled person.  The subjective element of 
the common law standard of skill has not been altered by federal statute.”336  
                                                 
329. Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp., [1998] 42 O.R. 3d 177 (Can. Ont. 
C.A.). 
330. Canadian Aero Services Ltd. v. O’Malley, [1974] S.C.R. 592 (Can.); see also 
Black et al., supra note 144, at 653.  
331. O’Brien, supra note 295, at ¶ 6.  
332. CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 122(2). 
333. Id. § 122(2)(b). 
334. Soper v. Her Majesty the Queen, [1998] 1 F.C. 124 (Can. C.A.). 
335. Id. 
336. Id.  
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The CBCA also states that directors owe a duty to “act honestly and in 
good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.”337  This 
formulation invokes a duty of good faith similar to the MBCA’s imposition of 
liability for “action not in good faith”338 and perhaps to the more limited duty 
recognized by Delaware courts.339  This CBCA provision may even encompass 
part of the duty of loyalty as recognized in U.S. law in that it requires directors to 
act in the best interests of the corporation.  Nonetheless, this language is less 
specific than an articulation of a duty of loyalty that requires disinterestedness and 
independence by directors in making decisions on behalf of the corporation, as 
appears in U.S. law and U.K. law.  
In Wise, the Supreme Court of Canada again confirmed that the fiduciary 
duties imposed upon directors are subjective and that, in considering the best 
interests of the corporation, directors may also consider the interests of 
shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments, and the 
environment.340  This formulation of interests differs from that of U.S. courts, 
which typically state that directors must consider only the best interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders.  Several years after Wise, the Canadian Supreme 
Court made it mandatory for the board to consider the interests of all stakeholders 
when making decisions for the corporation.341  It also expressly rejected the idea 
that shareholders’ interests should prevail.342  Thus, directors’ statutory duties in 
Canada are owed to the corporation and not to the shareholders.343 
Contrary to U.S. law but similar to U.K. law, the CBCA prohibits any 
exculpation of the directors’ fiduciary duties.344  It states that “no provision in a 
contract, the articles, the by-laws or a resolution relieves a director or officer from 
the duty to act in accordance with this Act or the regulations or relieves them from 
liability for a breach thereof.”345  In 2001, however, Canada amended the CBCA 
to replace joint and several liability with proportionate liability, meaning that 
“every defendant or third party who has been found responsible for a financial 
loss is liable to the plaintiff only for the portion of the damages that corresponds 
to their degree of responsibility for the loss.”346  While not exculpating directors’ 
liability, proportionate liability reduces the potential liability exposure of 
directors. 
                                                 
337. CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 122(1). 
338. MBCA § 8.31(a)(2)(i)–(iii) (2008). 
339. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364–65 (Del. 2006); In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63–64 (Del. 2006). 
340. People’s Dep’t Stores v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.); see also Catherine 
Francis, People’s Department Stores Inc. v. Wise: The Expanded Scope of Directors’ and 
Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and Duties of Care, 41 CAN. BUS. L.J. 175 (2004–2005).  
341. BCE v. 1967 Debenture Holders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.). 
342. Id. 
343. Alvi v. Misir, [2004] Carswell 5302, 57–58 (Ont.). 
344. CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 122(3). 
345. Id. 
346. Id. § 237(3); see also Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1442.  
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V. AUSTRALIA 
 
Australia’s corporate laws are established by the national government,347 
and its laws followed English law for many years.348  Since 1981, Australia has 
been engaged in an ongoing process of corporate law reform.349 Australia enacted 
a comprehensive statutory scheme for corporate governance in 2001.350  Its 
Corporations Act of 2001 has provisions that closely resemble those of the U.K. 
Companies Act.351  Like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, 
Australia’s corporate law requires a single board of directors,352 and directors are 
elected by shareholders.353  A national agency, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC), oversees all incorporations and is responsible 
for regulating corporations, stock markets, and financial services.354  ASIC 
administers Australia’s Corporations Act and can commence civil penalty 
proceedings, criminal proceedings, or administrative proceedings for violations of 
the statute.355  For instance, the ASIC may disqualify directors from continued 
service through an administrative ban or a civil penalty proceeding.356  ASIC’s 
                                                 
 347. See Paul von Nessen, Australian Effort to Promote Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Can Disclosure Alone Suffice?, 27 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (2009).  Once 
a company registers under the Corporations Act of 2001, it is automatically registered as an 
Australian company and can conduct business throughout Australia without the need to 
register in state or territorial jurisdictions.  Starting a Company, AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & 
INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/ASIC.NSF/byHeadline/ 
Starting%20a%20company%20or%business (last visited Dec. 31, 2011). 
348. Paul von Nessen, The Americanization of Australian Corporate Law, 26 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 239, 239–40 (1999). 
349. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1435. 
350. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 236(1) (Austl.). 
 351. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1435. 
 352. Elizabeth Shi, Board Structure and Board Composition in Australia and 
Germany: A Comparison in the Context of Corporate Governance, 2007 MACQUARIE J. 
BUS. L. 10 (2007); Peter Surgeon, Corporate Governance and Directors’ Duties in 
Australia, in GLOBAL COUNSEL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS’ DUTIES 
HANDBOOK (2003). 
 353. See Jennifer G. Hill, Subverting Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News Corp.’s 
Migration to Delaware, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1, 22 (2010) (noting that Australia’s 
Corporations Act § 203D grants “shareholders of public companies an absolute right to 
remove directors from office, with or without cause, by majority vote”). 
 354. Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1; see also 
von Nessen, supra note 348, at 249. 
355. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt. 5B; see von Nessen, supra note 348, at 262–63; 
Michelle Welsh, Civil Penalties and Responsive Regulation: The Gap Between Theory and 
Practice, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 908, 922 (2009) (noting that the ASIC issued 17 non-
criminal civil penalty applications alleging contravention of the duty of care between July 
1, 2001, and June 30, 2009); id. at 932 (noting that the ASIC commenced 88 court 
enforcement actions alleging contravention of directors’ duties, of which 85 were criminal 
prosecutions and three were civil penalty applications). 
356. Welsh, supra note 355, at 928–29 (citing Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 206). 
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active role in enforcing directors’ fiduciary duties distinguishes Australia’s 
corporate system from the other countries discussed in this article.357 
Until 2000, Australia allowed shareholder derivative actions pursuant to 
common law, which followed similarly narrow rules as U.K. common law.358  In 
2001, Australia enacted explicit rules for shareholder derivative actions in its 
Corporations Act.  The statute empowers a shareholder (called a member in 
Australia) to bring an action on behalf of the company or to intervene in any 
proceeding to which the company is a party if the shareholder receives leave of 
court.359  Contrary to U.S. law, Australia’s Corporations Act also permits a former 
shareholder to bring a derivative action or to intervene in an action to which the 
company is a party360 and gives the same authority to an officer or former officer 
of the company.361  Thus, like in the United Kingdom and Canada, to bring a 
shareholder derivative action or to intervene in an action to which an Australian 
company is a party, the current or former shareholder must first apply for leave of 
court.362  
Once a derivative action is initiated, the court is required to grant the 
shareholder leave to continue the case if it is satisfied that: a) the company will 
not bring or take responsibility for the case; b) the shareholder is acting in good 
faith; c) it is in the company’s best interests; d) “there is a serious question to be 
tried”; and e) either the applicant notified the company fourteen days before 
making the application or leave should be granted without such notice.363  These 
preconditions for leave to continue a shareholder derivative action are virtually 
identical to Canada’s statute.364  They are also similar to the U.K. Companies Act 
in that granting leave requires a good faith applicant and requires the company to 
have decided not to bring the lawsuit.  In addition, these preconditions are similar 
to the U.S. demand requirement in that the shareholder must have notified the 
company or show why such notice should not be required. 
Australia’s Corporations Act further creates “[a] rebuttable presumption 
that granting leave is not in the best interests of the company” if certain conditions 
are met.365  First, the proceedings must be by or against a third party.366  Second, 
the company must have decided not to bring or defend the proceedings or have 
decided to discontinue or settle the case.367 Third, all directors who participated in 
the challenged decision must have: 1) “acted in good faith for a proper purpose”; 
2) had no “material personal interest in the decision”; 3) “informed themselves 
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358. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1435; von Nessen, supra note 348, at 262. 
359. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 236(1). 
360. Id. s 236(1)(a). 
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363. Id. s 237(2). 
364. See CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 239 (Can.). 
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about the subject matter of the decision to the extent they reasonably believed to 
be appropriate”; and 4) “rationally believed that the decision was in the best 
interests of the company.”368  The  statute also states that a “director’s belief that 
the decision was in the best interests of the company is a rational one unless the 
belief is one that no reasonable person in their position would hold.”369  While 
Australia’s preconditions for granting leave are nearly identical to those under 
Canada’s statute, the CBCA does not include a rebuttable presumption that 
granting leave is not in the best interests of the company. 
This rebuttable presumption within the Australian Corporations Act, 
however, resembles U.S. law in several ways.  The third condition of the 
rebuttable presumption is similar to that of the business judgment rule recognized 
by U.S. states in that directors are presumed to have complied with their fiduciary 
duties of good faith, loyalty, and care.  Thus, like in the United States, the 
directors must have breached one of these fiduciary duties for the presumption to 
be rebutted.  However, this third condition appears to place the burden on the 
defendant directors to establish that they complied with their fiduciary duties, 
which is a burden borne by the plaintiff shareholders in the United States.  In 
addition, the second condition of Australia’s rebuttable presumption vaguely 
correlates to the U.S. demand requirement.  The first condition, however, differs 
from U.S. law.  It limits Australia’s rebuttable presumption to cases by or against 
a third party, which may exclude cases directly against directors.  Thus, no 
rebuttable presumption would apply when the shareholder brings suit against the 
directors, which differs greatly from the U.S. business judgment rule that protects 
directors from liability.  
Australian courts historically were deferential to directors’ business 
decisions, but they did not develop a U.S.-style business judgment rule defense 
that presumes directors complied with their fiduciary duties.370  Australia’s 
Corporations Act now recognizes a business judgment defense, which is popular 
among Australian directors.371  Indeed, Australia’s business judgment defense is 
identical to the third condition of the statute’s rebuttable presumption that granting 
leave is not in the company’s best interests.  Like U.S. law, Australia’s 
Corporation Act defines “business judgment” as encompassing a decision for the 
corporation to take or not to take action.372  The statute states that directors’ 
business judgment meets the statutory requirements and their equivalent common 
law duties if four criteria are satisfied.373  First, the directors “make the judgment 
in good faith for a proper purpose.”374  Second, they “do not have a material 
personal interest in the subject matter of the judgment.”375  Third, they “inform 
                                                 
368. Id. s 237(3)(c). 
369. Id. s 237(3). 
370. See von Nessen, supra note 348, at 264. 
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themselves about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably 
believe to be appropriate.”376  This subjective standard replicates U.K. law, rather 
than the objective standard of U.S. law.  Fourth, they “rationally believe that the 
judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.”377  The statute defines the 
directors’ belief as rational “unless the belief is one that no reasonable person in 
their position would hold.”378  Thus, similar to U.S. law, the directors’ business 
judgment is protected if they acted consistent with their duties of good faith, 
loyalty, and care.  Unlike U.S. law, however, Australia’s Corporations Act places 
the burden on the directors to establish these four criteria, meaning the directors 
must prove that they complied with their fiduciary duties.  
Australia’s Corporations Act also imposes fiduciary duties on directors.  
Indeed, a recurring theme of Australia’s corporate law reform has been the 
creation of legal obligations for directors.379  Core fiduciary duties originally 
created through case law are now contained within Australia’s Corporations 
Act.380  It creates a duty of care quite similar to U.S. law, requiring directors to 
“exercise their powers and discharge their duties with the degree of care and 
diligence that a reasonable person would exercise.”381  Similar to Canada, 
however, Australia limits the reasonable person standard to “a director . . . of a 
corporation in the corporation’s circumstances” and with the same responsibilities 
as the director.382  Within the statement of its business judgment rule and the 
rebuttable presumption that granting leave is not in the company’s best interests, 
Australia’s Corporations Act imposes duties of good faith and loyalty that are 
similar to U.S. law.  It requires that directors make decisions in good faith and that 
directors not have material personal interests when making decisions for the 
company.383  
Even though Australia’s Corporations Act allows for shareholder 
derivative actions, there are numerous disincentives under Australian law for 
bringing such actions.  Like the United Kingdom and Canada, Australia has a 
“loser pays” litigation rule.384  Further, even if ultimately successful, a shareholder 
will have his or her legal fees paid only if the court orders this payment, and any 
monetary recovery goes to the company.385  In addition, like the United Kingdom, 
Australian law does not typically allow contingency fees for lawyers.386  
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Finally, a shareholder in an Australian corporation may be able to pursue 
a direct action and avoid the restrictions imposed on a derivative action.  
Australia’s Corporations Act permits shareholders to pursue a direct shareholder 
action on the ground of unfair prejudice,387 which is identical to the direct actions 
permitted in the United Kingdom and Canada as well as similar to direct actions 
for oppression under U.S. law.  Thus, Australia does not limit shareholders to 
pursing derivative actions.  The need for direct shareholder actions, however, may 
be less in Australia than in the United States because its statute imposes less 
onerous burdens on shareholders pursuing derivative actions.  In particular, 
Australia’s Corporations Act places the burden on the defendant directors to show 
that they have satisfied their fiduciary duties.388 
 
 
VI. CRITICISM OF SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS INFLUENCE  
ON THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA 
 
The United States originally imported the shareholder derivative device 
and other aspects of its legal system from England.  Like the United States, 
Canada and Australia are former English colonies, and their legal systems are 
rooted in English legal traditions.  The most recognized and frequent uses of 
shareholder derivative actions occur in the United States.  By contrast, such 
actions have traditionally been rare in the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
Australia.  After many years of limited recognition under common law in the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, shareholder derivative actions have now 
been statutorily authorized in these countries.  Despite the intense criticism of 
derivative litigation in the United States, described in Section A below, these 
countries have expanded the availability of shareholder derivative actions, and 
their statutes are comparable in many respects to those of U.S. states.  Section B 
examines the influence of U.S. critics, if any, on the shareholder derivative 
statutes enacted by these countries. 
 
 
A. Criticism of U.S. Shareholder Derivative Litigation  
 
Shareholder derivative litigation is frequently criticized within the United 
States.  State legislatures and courts have attempted to curtail shareholder 
derivative litigation in numerous ways, including establishing bond requirements, 
enacting permissive indemnification statutes, and imposing heightened pleading 
requirements; each has “been proclaimed in turn as the death knell of the 
                                                 
387. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 232–235. 
388. See supra notes 362–78 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for 
leave to continue a derivative action and requirements for the business judgment rule).  
Australia’s Corporations Act also permits a former shareholder to pursue a derivative 
action.  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 236(1)(a). 
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derivative suit.”389  Likewise, scholars have argued that shareholder derivative 
lawsuits are broken and need reform.390  One reform proposal suggests restricting 
the filing of such suits to shareholders who own a sufficient stake in the company 
to ensure effective representation of the corporation’s interests.391  Similarly, 
another suggested reform proposes that fiduciary duties be imposed on lead 
plaintiffs in shareholder derivative actions.392  One scholar proposes the use of an 
“equity trustee,” who would serve as the shareholders’ representative and monitor 
management.393  
Other scholars advocate that shareholder derivative litigation should be 
eliminated entirely.  In publicly traded corporations, a separation exists between 
ownership and control.394  Shareholders provide capital and bear the financial risk 
of the enterprise, while directors control and manage the shareholders’ capital 
with their expertise.395  This separation of powers results in a principal-agent 
relationship in public corporations.396  Principal-agent theorists contend that a 
cause of action against directors or a third party, such as a supplier in breach of a 
contract, is an asset that is properly left to the directors’ expertise.397  These 
scholars argue that although market mechanisms may align directors and 
shareholders’ financial interests, they do little to ensure that shareholders and their 
attorneys act in the interest of the corporation and all of the shareholders.398  
Similarly, they assert that “a meritless [derivative] suit brought by a plaintiff 
without the corporation’s best interest in mind can become a significant drain on 
                                                 
389. James D. Cox, Searching for Corporation’s Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A 
Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 959 (1982) (“Like the heroine 
in a Saturday matinee, the derivative suit has repeatedly appeared to be at the cliffs of 
disaster.”). 
390. Erickson, supra note 49, at 1830. 
391. Id. at 1830–31 (“The time is coming, however, when we will have to address the 
broader question of whether to draw the curtain on shareholder derivative suits altogether.  
My study finds that shareholder derivative suits are broken, a conclusion that leads to two 
possible—but very different—avenues for reform.  If shareholder derivative suits are 
duplicative of other litigation, then corporate law may not need them.  If, on the other hand, 
shareholder derivative suits have the potential to serve as an independent and meaningful 
check on corporate misconduct, then policymakers and scholars should focus on reforming 
these suits.”). 
392. Amy M. Koopmann, A Necessary Gatekeeper: The Fiduciary Duties of the Lead 
Plaintiff in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 34 J. CORP. L. 895, 914–21 (2009). 
393. Kelli A. Alces, The Equity Trustee, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717, 720–21 (2010) 
(explaining that the equity trustee would be elected by the seven largest shareholders, paid 
by the corporation, and would owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders). 
394. Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical 
Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1631 (2002). 
395. Id. at 1681. 
396. Id. 
397. Id. 
398. Id. (“A major weakness of representative litigation in general is that the agent 
controlling the litigation often does not have the same interests as the principal.”).  
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the corporation’s and its shareholders’ resources.”399  They also argue that 
shareholder derivative litigation is an ineffective mechanism for controlling 
directors’ conduct.400  For these reasons, principal-agent theorists conclude that 
shareholder derivative litigation should be abolished.401  
Others argue that the board of directors should be abolished.402  If a 
union between ownership and control occurred, then shareholders would be in 
control, corporate governance would improve, and “it might be possible to restrict 
or eliminate derivative lawsuits.”403  It has been argued that while the law places 
accountability for corporate decisions on boards of directors, “boards cannot be 
meaningfully responsible for corporate decisionmaking,” and “[m]oney spent on 
pursuing litigation against corporate directors is wasted, by and large, as directors 
are shielded from personal liability . . . .”404  A unification of ownership and 
control, however, is unlikely to occur in public corporations or large private 
corporations within the United States.  Professor Lynne L. Dallas proposes instead 
that corporations adopt a dual board structure; a conflicts board composed of 
independent directors would monitor for conflicts, while a business review board 
composed of a mix of directors would perform the other board functions.405  She 
also proposes that a full-time “board ombudsman,” who is independent from the 
corporation’s management, be appointed “by independent directors on the 
conflicts board or unitary board” to assist them in monitoring conflicts.406 
Professor Stephen Bainbridge has also advocated for the abolition of 
shareholder derivative litigation.  He argues that “derivative litigation appears to 
have little, if any, beneficial accountability effects” but imposes “a high cost 
constraint and infringement upon the board’s authority.”407  In support of 
abolishing derivative litigation, Professor Bainbridge argues that “various forms 
                                                 
399. Koopmann, supra note 392, at 897. 
400. Meese, supra note 394, at 1681–82. 
401. Id. 
402. See George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public 
Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 902–03 (“The problems of corporate governance will 
not be solved until ownership and control are united. . . . If corporate boards serve little 
purpose and if reform proposals . . . promise scant improvement, perhaps the board of 
directors should be abolished.”); see also Alces, supra note 91, at 785–86 (arguing that the 
board of directors should be eliminated and its functions assigned to “the real corporate 
decision makers”: the officers, investors, and other “parties in interest that are essential the 
firm’s daily operations and capital structure”). 
403. Dent, supra note 402, at 915.  
404. Alces, supra note 91, at 784. 
405. Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of Directors: The 
Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91, 93 (1997). 
406. Id. at 130–31; see also Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards 
of Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 781, 820 (2003) (recommending that a board include 
“employee directors who have incentives to protect their stakes in the corporations and who 
are able to provide diverse perspectives and information to improve the quality of board 
decisionmaking”). 
407. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 404. 
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of market discipline” exist to hold directors accountable for their actions.408  At a 
minimum, he urges courts “to discourage derivative litigation.”409  Professor 
Bainbridge is also one of many scholars who oppose Delaware’s current 
formulation of the business judgment rule defense,410 which is another area of 
shareholder derivative litigation frequently debated by U.S. scholars.411  
In addition, empirical studies of U.S. shareholder derivative litigation 
have led some commentators to argue for abolition of derivative actions.  
Empirical studies show that settlement rates appear to be higher in shareholder 
derivative actions than other civil litigation cases and that such settlements tend to 
award plaintiffs’ attorneys large legal fees.412  One empirical study also 
documented the prevalence of derivative lawsuit settlements focused on general 
corporate governance reforms, rather than solutions to specific allegations of 
                                                 
408. Id.  
409. Id. (“[I]t seems unlikely that courts or legislatures will eliminate derivative 
litigation any time soon.  In the meanwhile, courts should use the tools at hand to 
discourage derivative litigation.”).  
410. Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 101; see also Brown, supra note 127, at 55 (arguing 
that “the business judgment rule was not meant to apply to conflict-of-interest transactions” 
and advocating that approval of a conflicted decision by a majority independent board 
should “only shift to the plaintiffs the burden of showing the unfairness of the 
transaction”); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or 
Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 336–37 (1994) (advocating for the abolition of 
the business judgment rule and concluding that courts should apply the ordinary negligence 
standard to review directors’ actions). 
411. See Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 83–84 (“Countless cases invoke it and 
countless scholars have analyzed it.  Yet despite all of the attention lavished on it, the 
business judgment rule remains poorly understood.”); see also Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once 
More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573, 573 (2000) (noting that 
“thousands of pages of corporate law scholarship and commentary have been devoted to” 
the business judgment rule); Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and 
Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 270 (1967) (stating the business judgment rule is “one of 
the least understood concepts in the entire corporate field”).  Many commentators agree 
with the courts’ burden-shifting formulation of the business judgment rule as a standard of 
liability.  See, e.g., Arsht, supra note 72, at 133; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of 
Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 
437, 444–45 (1993).  Other commentators believe that this formulation simply restates the 
principle that defendants are entitled to summary judgment when the plaintiff fails to make 
a prima facie case and advocate that the rule instead should be viewed as an abstention 
doctrine.  See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 101; D. A. Jeremy Telman, The Business 
Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 830 (2007). 
412. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 48, at 60–61 (finding that in a study surveying all 
shareholder suits brought from the late 1960s to 1987, that only 128 reached final 
resolution and of those 65% settled); Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A 
Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 525–26 (1991) 
(finding that the general civil litigation settlement rate is 60% to 70%, but, in a small 
sample of securities class actions, 100% of cases settled).  
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misconduct.413  These studies provide support for the view “that many derivative 
suits are strike suits in which the real winners are not corporations or their 
shareholders, but attorneys.”414  Viewing the empirical evidence, one scholar 
concluded that “shareholder litigation appears to be more open to abuse by 
frivolous lawsuits than other fields of private litigation.”415  At a minimum, the 
deterrence value of derivative suits may be lessened because so many suits end in 
dismissal or settlement.416 
Aside from the possibility of strike suits, some commentators argue that 
shareholder derivative litigation should be severely limited for other reasons.  
Professors Henry Butler and Larry Ribstein note that “even if the procedural 
problems of a derivative suit are solved, it is not clear if the derivative suit is an 
appropriate remedy because the benefits of the derivative remedy remain 
unclear.”417  They question whether a monetary damages award “serves any 
compensatory role, since many of the shareholders of the corporation at the time 
recovery is administered are likely to have bought their shares at prices that 
already reflected the wrong from the shareholders whose shares were devalued by 
the wrong.”418  
While courts in the United States have not explicitly stated that 
shareholder derivative actions should be abolished, courts have frequently noted 
their dislike for such actions.  In Marx v. Akers, the New York Supreme Court 
stated that “[b]y their very nature, shareholder derivative actions infringe upon the 
managerial discretion of corporate boards.”419  For this reason, courts “have 
historically been reluctant to permit shareholder derivative lawsuits,” and when 
permitted, courts have restrained their power “to direct the management of a 
corporation’s affairs.”420  Similarly, courts often state that directors are “better-
suited than courts to make business decisions” and defer to the directors’ decisions 
even though challenged by shareholders.421  
Abolishing the derivative lawsuit, however, may not solve all the burdens 
imposed by frivolous and abusive shareholder litigation.  Shareholders may still 
                                                 
 413. Erickson, supra note 49, at 1823 (finding that derivative lawsuits are 
disproportionately filed against large public companies, are expensive for corporations, and 
do not benefit the corporations based on a study showing that almost 70% of suits are 
dismissed and nearly all of the remaining 30% settle). 
 414. See Romano, supra note 49, at 61; see also Alexander, supra note 412, at 525–
26; Erickson, supra note 49, at 1756. 
415. Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suite: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit 
and the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 368 (1994).  
416. Id. at 1826–27. 
417. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A 
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (1990). 
418. Id. at 55.  
419. Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (N.Y. 1996) (citing Gordon v. Elliman, 
119 N.E.2d 331, 335 (N.Y. 1954)).  
420. Id.  
421. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also 
Branson, supra note 66, at 637; Costa, supra note 74, at 46.  
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file direct shareholder lawsuits asserting injuries in their individual capacities, 
rather than to the corporation as a whole.422  Using a direct lawsuit, “[a] skillful 
plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney may find various ways to attack the corporate 
officials’ alleged wrongdoing.”423  Nevertheless, shareholders’ claims would be 
limited without the ability to proceed derivatively, because not all derivative 
claims can be creatively pled as direct claims involving individual injuries. 
 
 
B. U.S. Critics’ Influence on the Shareholder Derivative Statutes Enacted by 
the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia  
 
If shareholder derivative litigation were universally disfavored, one 
would expect countries to be abandoning such litigation through legislative 
enactments or judicial rulings, particularly other common law countries such as 
the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.  The true state of affairs, however, is 
quite different; the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have recently enacted 
statutes expressly authorizing shareholder derivative lawsuits on broader grounds 
than permitted at common law.  Critics calling for the abolition of U.S. 
shareholder derivative litigation thus did not deter these countries from expanding 
the availability of shareholder derivative actions.  
  Yet the United States potentially influenced these countries in other 
ways.  For instance, a majority of U.S. states have codified shareholders’ right to 
file derivative actions through adoption of the MBCA, and this same trend toward 
codification can be seen in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.  These 
countries’ statutory enactments authorizing shareholder derivative litigation even 
partially resemble the MBCA provisions adopted by many U.S. states.  However, 
they did not imitate the exact statutory language of U.S. states, which leads to 
several questions.  Why did the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia choose to 
statutorily authorize shareholder derivative actions?  Have these countries’ 
statutory enactments been influenced by U.S. critics’ call for limitations on 
derivative actions?  Further, do these countries’ statutes offer improvements for 
shareholder derivative litigation in the United States?  
The United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have adopted statutory 
schemes that authorize shareholder derivative lawsuits and that articulate the 
procedures and arguably the liability standards for such actions.424  One obvious 
motivation for such statutes is to allow shareholders a means of redress for 
wrongdoing by corporate management.  These countries may also be attempting to 
improve overall corporate governance by increasing shareholders’ incentives to 
                                                 
422. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 362–64. 
423. Brandi, supra note 415, at 400.  A shareholder may file a direct action if the 
cause of action belongs to the shareholder individually; for example, in claims involving 
oppression of minority shareholders.  BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 362–63. 
424. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 260–263, 171–180 (U.K.); CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, 
c. C-44, §§ 239–240, 122–123 (Can.); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 236–239, 180 
(Austl.). 
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oversee the activities of management.  Similarly, because these statutes increase 
the possibility that directors can be held liable for misconduct, such as a breach of 
fiduciary duty, directors’ awareness of that potential liability may improve 
corporate governance.  To the extent that these countries were motivated to adopt 
their statutes for these objectives, one could argue that they were imitating, or at 
least replicating, the same often-recognized goals of U.S. shareholder derivative 
law.425  More broadly, these countries may have statutorily authorized shareholder 
derivative actions in an effort to increase investors’ confidence and to strengthen 
their ability to compete for capital within the competitive global economy.  For 
instance, these countries may be seeking to better compete with U.S. corporations 
in which shareholders have the right to pursue such actions.  Likewise, they might 
have specifically enacted such statutes to better compete for U.S. investors, who 
are familiar with the shareholder derivative action.  If either of these scenarios 
were the motivation for these countries’ statutes, they were purposefully imitating 
U.S. shareholder derivative litigation to attract investors.  
It is unknown whether these new statutory schemes will increase the 
number of shareholder derivative actions filed and whether these statutes will 
ultimately improve shareholder oversight or director behavior.  Since the current 
Companies Act was implemented, the United Kingdom has not experienced a 
dramatic increase in the number of shareholder derivative actions filed.  Neither 
have Canada or Australia.  However, all three countries have well-functioning 
judicial systems capable of effectively resolving shareholder derivative actions 
and providing remedies.  More important, these countries’ statutes have resolved 
the ambiguity that existed under common law about the availability and the 
requirements for pursuing a shareholder derivative action.  
Setting aside the intent and ultimate success of these statutes, U.S. critics 
may have influenced the particular shareholder derivative statutes enacted by the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.  As already shown, these countries’ 
statutes replicate only certain aspects of the MBCA adopted by many U.S. states 
and of Delaware law,426 so the limitations suggested by U.S. critics might have 
been carefully considered by these countries.  For instance, these countries may 
have adopted provisions to deter the filing of weak or meritless lawsuits that harm 
the corporation by imposing costs that far exceed the benefits of such litigation to 
the corporation and its shareholders.  If so, U.S. critics may have influenced these 
countries to adopt provisions that improve the shareholder derivative device.427  In 
turn, the statutory provisions adopted by these countries may offer solutions for 
reforming or improving the deficiencies perceived by critics of shareholder 
derivative litigation in the United States.  
                                                 
425. See Hurt, supra note 46, at 365–66. 
426. See supra Parts III.A & C, IV.A & C, & V. 
427. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory 
of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 510–11 (1987) (arguing that “there are 
benefits to those devices that reduce frivolous shareholder litigation”). 
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Many of the criticisms against U.S. shareholder derivative actions 
address the possibility of strike suits,428 which can be described as suits filed by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys solely or primarily for the purpose of obtaining fees, as 
opposed to achieving value for the corporation and its shareholders.429  Some U.S. 
states have attempted to curb strike suits through the financial disincentive of 
bond requirements, while other states rely primarily on pleading requirements and 
the presumption of the business judgment rule defense to deter such suits.430  The 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have a much more potent financial 
disincentive: the loser pays rule.431  Given the typically high costs of litigating 
shareholder derivative actions, the potential financial burden of paying the 
opponent’s costs and attorneys’ fees is a significant disincentive to filing such 
actions.  Although courts can relieve unsuccessful plaintiffs of the obligation to 
pay their opponents’ costs,432 plaintiffs and their attorneys do not know if a court 
will do so until after the litigation ends.  For this reason, these countries have less 
need to enact statutory provisions addressing strike suits.  If U.S. legislatures were 
to adopt a loser pays rule for shareholder derivative litigation, it may prove to be 
an effective deterrent against strike suits.  However, passage of such legislation 
may be difficult given the strength of the plaintiffs’ bar and institutional 
shareholders in the United States. 
Another financial disincentive for filing shareholder derivative actions 
exists in Australia: the prohibition against contingency fees.  This financial 
disincentive exists to a lesser degree in the United Kingdom, which permits only 
conditional fee agreements.  In the United States, and in most jurisdictions in 
                                                 
428. Id. (“But, regardless of one’s view on the overall desirability of shareholder 
derivative suits, there is general agreement that at least some fraction of such suits are 
‘strike’ suits, brought only to enrich plaintiffs’ attorneys.”); Richard W. Duesenberg, The 
Business Judgement Rule and Shareholder Derivative Suits: A View from the Inside, 60 
WASH. U.L.Q. 311, 331–33 (1982) (arguing that “[f]iling lawsuits with little or no merit has 
become, it seems, a way of life with many lawyers”). But see Robert B. Thompson & 
Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 1747, 1749–50 (2004) (arguing that most derivative suits are not strike suits). 
429. For example, some strike suits may be brought to force a settlement that 
generates large fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys, but little to no value for the corporation and its 
shareholders.  See Romano, supra note 49, at 65 (arguing that attorneys are the primary 
beneficiaries of derivative suits); Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from 
Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 351 (2001) (“Shareholders seldom profit—suits are filed 
because their attorneys stand to reap substantial fees.”); see also Hurt, supra note 46, at 
381–82 (explaining that plaintiffs’ attorneys hired on a contingency fee basis are in the 
driver’s seat in derivative actions because of shareholders’ collective action problem). 
430. See Cox, supra note 389, at 959; see also supra note 44 (listing states with bond 
requirements); supra notes 77–87 and accompanying text (discussing protection of 
directors’ decisions provided by the business judgment rule). 
431. See Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1406 (United Kingdom); Black et al., 
supra note 53, at 14 (Canada); Clark, supra note 53, at 148 (Australia). 
432. See Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1406 (United Kingdom); Black et al., 
supra note 53, at 14 (Canada); Clark, supra note 53, at 148 (Australia). 
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Canada, contingent fee agreements offer plaintiffs’ attorneys a strong incentive to 
accept shareholder derivative actions even if the claims are weak.433  Under a 
typical U.S. contingent fee agreement, the plaintiffs’ attorneys will receive as 
much as 40% of the plaintiffs’ recovery.434  The plaintiffs’ attorney may receive a 
windfall if the plaintiffs succeed because their actual fees are likely to be lower 
than the contingency fee, as most derivative cases settle.435  If the plaintiff loses, 
however, the plaintiff’s attorney must bear the costs with no reimbursement from 
the plaintiff.436  By contrast, Australia does not permit contingency fees, which 
means the plaintiff must pay the attorney during the litigation and will likely not 
be reimbursed if unsuccessful.437  The Australian statute thus does not need to 
counteract the incentives to file derivative actions that are created by contingency 
fees.  Although the United Kingdom permits conditional fee agreements, such 
agreements do not offer plaintiffs’ attorneys the same incentive to pursue 
shareholder derivative actions.438  Under a conditional fee agreement, the attorney 
will recover only the amount of his fees if successful and must bear all the costs if 
unsuccessful.439  
Contingency fees play an important role in strike suits filed in the United 
States and essentially make the plaintiffs’ attorney the real party in interest in 
derivative litigation.440  If the United States were to follow Australia’s example 
and prohibit contingency fees, plaintiffs’ attorneys may be financially deterred 
from filing strike suits.  However, legislatures are unlikely to prohibit contingency 
                                                 
433. See Hurt, supra note 46, at 382; Say H. Goo & Rolf H. Weber, The Expropriation 
Game: Minority Shareholders’ Protection, 33 HONG KONG L.J. 71, 94 (2003) (“In the 
United States, while the contingency fee system has made it possible for attorneys who are 
willing to fund the litigation to help solve the collective action problem, it has also 
encouraged attorneys to bring ‘strike suits’ only for the fees.”); Larry E. Ribstein, 
Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1431, 1472–73 (2006) (“The plaintiff is a nominal holder while the real party at interest is 
the lawyer who stands to receive a contingency fee by winning or (more often) settling the 
case. . . . For example, the attorney . . . may bring a strike suit solely to provoke a strategic 
settlement . . . .”). 
434. See Brickman, supra note 48, at 706; Fitzpatrick, supra note 48, at 2045 n.9. 
435. See Goo & Weber, supra note 433, at 94; Ribstein, supra note 433, at 1472–73 
(“The plaintiff is a nominal holder while the real party at interest is the lawyer who stands 
to receive a contingency fee by winning or (more often) settling the case.”). 
436. See Kon Sik Kim, The Demand on Directors Requirement and the Business 
Judgment Rule in the Shareholder Derivative Suit: An Alternative Framework, 6 J. CORP. 
L. 511, 521 n.56 (1981) (“Moreover, because an attorney usually serves in derivative 
actions on a contingency fee basis and is therefore unlikely to be paid unless the suit is 
successful or favorably settled, he will carefully weigh the merits of the suit before 
undertaking it.”). 
437. See von Nessen, supra note 386, at 668, 683. 
438. See Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 405. 
439. See id. 
440. See Hurt, supra note 46, at 381–82; see also Ribstein, supra note 433, at 1472–73  
(“The plaintiff is a nominal holder while the real party at interest is the lawyer who stands 
to receive a contingency fee by winning or (more often) settling the case.”). 
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fees only for shareholder derivative lawsuits, particularly since the possibility of 
strike suits exists in all types of cases.  In addition, institutional investors would 
likely lobby against such a prohibition, arguing that it harms shareholders, reduces 
management’s accountability, and may lead to corporate mismanagement.  
Legislatures are also unlikely to prohibit contingency fees in all cases because that 
would potentially harm plaintiffs in other types of cases, such as personal injury 
and employment cases.  In addition, as with the loser pays rule, the strong 
plaintiffs’ bar would likely make passage of legislation barring all contingency 
fees difficult.  Further, various employee, labor, and victims’ rights organizations 
may join plaintiffs’ attorneys in lobbying against a prohibition on contingency 
fees in all cases.  
Despite the existing financial disincentives, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia enacted provisions requiring shareholders to seek the 
court’s permission to pursue derivative litigation.441  One could argue that this 
requirement addresses the strike suit problem identified by U.S. critics because at 
the very beginning of a derivative suit, the court must make a determination that 
the case satisfies statutorily specified criteria and thus is worthy of proceeding.  
To some extent, these statutory provisions requiring leave of court to pursue 
derivative actions parallel the U.S. demand requirement, which requires courts to 
consider whether demand was wrongfully rejected by the board or, in some states, 
whether demand should be waived.  Further, these statutory provisions may 
function similar to the U.S. business judgment rule, but at a slightly earlier stage 
in the proceedings.  For these reasons, these countries’ statutory provisions 
requiring leave of court to pursue shareholder derivative actions may not 
meaningfully differ from the court determinations required by U.S. law.  
In addition, these countries’ leave of court statutory provisions may not 
deter, and may even encourage, the filing of shareholder derivative lawsuits.  The 
criteria stated in the U.K.’s Companies Act, Canada’s CBCA, and Australia’s 
Corporations Act make the leave of court determination a fact-based inquiry into 
whether the applicant is acting in good faith.442  The U.K.’s Companies Act also 
requires the court essentially to consider the importance that a director or officer 
would attach to continuing the case, which is another fact-based inquiry.443  
Similarly, the CBCA requires the court to consider whether the action is in the 
company’s best interests.444  Like the CBCA, Australia’s Corporations Act 
requires the court to consider whether the action is in the company’s best interests, 
but it also creates a rebuttable presumption that granting leave is not in the 
company’s best interests if certain conditions are met.445  One of those conditions 
requires the court to ascertain whether the directors have satisfied their fiduciary 
                                                 
441. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 261–263 (U.K.); CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, 
§§ 239–240 (Can.); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 236–237 (Austl.). 
442. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 263(3)(a) (U.K.); CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 
239(b) (Can.); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 237(2)(b) (Austl.). 
443. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 263(3)(b) (U.K.). 
444. CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 239(c) (Can.). 
445. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 237(2)(c), (3) (Austl.). 
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duties of good faith, loyalty, and care.446  These fact-intensive inquiries give 
courts a great deal of discretion, which leads to unpredictability and thus may 
encourage attorneys to take the chance that a shareholder derivative lawsuit will 
be granted leave to continue.  
U.S. critics of shareholder derivative litigation may believe that courts 
will use this discretion to prevent derivative actions from continuing, but the 
discretion could just as often be used to allow such cases to continue.  Thus, even 
if U.S. states were to adopt similar statutory provisions expressly requiring 
shareholders to seek court permission to pursue derivative actions, it is difficult to 
predict with certainty how courts would generally exercise that discretion.  For 
this reason, these statutory provisions cannot be hastily deemed to prevent or deter 
strike suits.  Based on the long history of U.S. courts’ deference to directors’ 
business decisions under the current formulations of the business judgment rule, 
some may argue that courts would stop more derivative actions from continuing if 
given the explicit power to determine whether to grant leave for such actions.  
However, if a new statutory provision were enacted requiring courts to consider 
specific criteria before granting permission to continue derivative actions, then 
U.S. courts may interpret it as requiring a new level of scrutiny that differs from 
that historical deference.  In the end, U.S. critics of derivative actions are unlikely 
to view such statutory provisions as an improvement of U.S. law, because 
shareholders can still second-guess directors’ decisions by filing derivative 
lawsuits and force directors to defend their actions in arguing that the court should 
not grant leave to continue the lawsuits. 
In addition, these countries’ statutory provisions requiring shareholders 
to seek permission to pursue derivative actions vary from U.S. law in ways that 
may deter U.S. critics from advocating for their adoption in U.S. states.  The 
United Kingdom permits shareholders to pursue derivative actions for conduct 
that occurred before the shareholder acquired his or her shares, and Australia 
permits former shareholders to pursue derivative actions.447  Both of these 
provisions would likely exacerbate the perceived strike suits problem if adopted 
by U.S. states.  They may also strengthen Professors Butler and Ribstein’s 
argument that monetary damages do not serve a compensatory role.448  For 
instance, when shareholders bring suit for conduct occurring before they acquired 
their shares, presumably the price they paid had already been reduced by the 
wrongful conduct.  Interestingly, despite broadening the possible shareholder 
plaintiffs, these countries did not adopt any ownership stake requirement or 
impose fiduciary duties on such plaintiffs as advocated by U.S. critics.  These 
countries also did not adopt provisions specifically designed to deal with the 
conflicts of interest among shareholders, or those between shareholders and 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.449 
                                                 
446. Id. s 237(3)(c). 
447. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 260(4) (U.K.); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)           
s 236(1)(a) (Austl.). 
448. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 417, at 54. 
449. Hurt, supra note 46, at 382. 
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Additional aspects of Australian law would likely prove troubling to U.S. 
critics if adopted in the United States.  Australia places the burden on directors to 
show that they satisfied their duties of good faith, loyalty, and care when the court 
determines whether the lawsuit is in the best interests of the company.450  U.S. 
critics who think that shareholder derivative litigation already interferes with 
corporate management are likely to find Australia’s statute even more problematic 
in this regard.  Australia’s corporate governance statutes are also unique in that a 
government agency is given the authority to enforce directors’ fiduciary duties.451  
Critics of U.S. shareholder derivative litigation are unlikely to embrace a similar 
proposal in the United States, unless perhaps the government agency supplanted 
shareholders’ right to bring derivative litigation, although they would likely find a 
government regulator problematic as well.  If both shareholders and a government 
regulator could bring lawsuits alleging directors breached their fiduciary duties, 
U.S. corporations would have reason to fear that a shareholder derivative lawsuit 
would be filed after each action initiated by the regulator based on the example of 
U.S. securities law.  Soon after the SEC begins actions to enforce U.S. securities 
laws and regulations, shareholder derivative lawsuits that challenge essentially the 
same conduct are often filed.452  In any event, a unified federal regulator of all 
U.S. corporations is unlikely because corporations have historically been created 
and governed by state law.453  However, this history perhaps could be overcome in 
the case of publicly listed corporations, which are already governed extensively by 
federal securities laws.454 
Ultimately, the frequency and success of shareholder derivative actions is 
impacted by a number of factors that may vary among countries.  For instance, the 
views of the judiciary and plaintiffs’ attorneys of shareholder derivative actions 
may affect the number and type of actions that are filed.  Similarly, the availability 
of contingency fee agreements will impact those issues.  Shareholders’ opinions 
about their role in corporate governance or about litigation generally may increase 
or decrease the number of derivative actions filed.  This article’s comparative 
                                                 
450. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 237(3)(c) (Austl.). 
451. See von Nessen, supra note 348, at 249; Welsh, supra note 355, at 922, 932. 
452. See Hurt, supra note 46, at 365–66; see also Proxy Statements and Proxies Under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Securities Filings 2006, 1567 PLI/Corp 99, at 
150 (2006) (noting that shareholder derivative lawsuits “ha[ve] naturally followed” SEC 
enforcement actions “against such industry leaders as Tyson Foods, Inc., The Walt Disney 
Company, and General Electric Company”); Michael D. Torpey et al., Defending Securities 
Claims, in ALI-ABA COURSE STUDY – SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND STRATEGIES 
691 (2008) (stating that “derivative actions usually still follow SEC enforcement and 
private securities class actions” within discussion of the interplay of securities class actions, 
derivative actions, SEC investigations, and criminal litigation). 
453. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); BAINBRIDGE, supra 
note 16, at 5. 
454. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate 
Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860 (2003) (noting that 
federal securities laws impose more stringent requirements on public companies than state 
laws). 
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analysis suggests that shareholder derivative litigation is not dying anytime soon.  
It also demonstrates that the statutory and judicial interpretations of such litigation 
in the United States can influence other countries.  Legislatures, courts, and critics 
in the United States would be wise to learn from other countries’ statutory 
enactments and judicial interpretations regarding shareholder derivative litigation.  
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The recent statutory enactments in the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
Australia resemble certain aspects of U.S. shareholder derivative law, and 
therefore suggest that such actions will have continuing viability in the United 
States despite being intensely criticized by U.S. scholars.  These statutes also 
suggest that shareholder derivative litigation has become a means by which 
countries seek to attract investors, whether through a perception of improved 
corporate governance by authorizing such actions or through simple imitation of 
the availability of such actions in the United States.  However, investors familiar 
with U.S. shareholder derivative litigation should not assume that these countries’ 
statutory enactments are replicating U.S.-style derivative litigation.  Nor should 
investors assume that the expanded authorization of such litigation will 
necessarily improve corporate governance. 
As shareholder derivative litigation spreads around the globe, U.S. critics 
urging its abolition have been largely ignored.  Yet, the United States appears to 
have partially influenced the shareholder derivative statutes enacted by the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and may well have been the competitive 
motivation for the adoption of such statutes.  Rather than calling for the abolition 
of shareholder derivative litigation, U.S. critics must focus on reforming the 
perceived deficiencies of such litigation.  By focusing on improvements, the 
United States can influence other countries as they develop and revise shareholder 
derivative procedures and standards.  In turn, other countries’ statutory and 
judicial developments may offer improvements for U.S. shareholder derivative 
litigation.  With the global expansion of shareholder derivative litigation, U.S. 
critics must broaden their focus beyond the United States’ experience with such 
actions. 
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